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ABSTRACT 
The Taliban have managed to expand their political and military influence every 
year for the last five years, and if this trend is not stopped and ultimately reversed, the 
government of Afghanistan will likely collapse.  While there is not one solution for 
victory in Afghanistan, some counterinsurgency precepts are more critical than others.  
This thesis examines and explains why legitimate police are vital to defeating the Taliban 
insurgency.  Additionally, this thesis identifies and seeks to validate two key 
recommendations for improving the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan National 
Police.  First, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Government of 
the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) need to make the Afghan National Police 
their number one priority for resources and manpower.  Second, the Afghan National 
Police must be fundamentally restructured in accordance with traditional and cultural 
precepts to meet the needs of rural Afghan communities.  Tailoring police reform to meet 
the needs of rural Afghans can reverse the Taliban’s influence and legitimacy in 
Afghanistan’s critical periphery. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Success in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations requires establishing a 
legitimate government supported by the people and able to address the 
fundamental causes that insurgents use to gain support.1 
A. FOR MOST AFGHANS, THE POLICE ARE THE GOVERNMENT 
Top U.S. and NATO officials acknowledge that the coalition is not winning the 
war in Afghanistan.2  While not winning does not mean losing, many coalition partners 
have grown weary after eight years of conflict.  Even with over 100,000 NATO soldiers 
assisting the Afghan government, the security situation is worse today than it was seven 
years ago.3  The coalition has steadily increased the number of counterinsurgent forces 
and resources over the years, yet the Taliban have managed to continually gain ground 
and expand their political and military influence every year for the past five years.4   
If the Taliban’s ability to gain popular support is not stopped and ultimately 
reversed, the government of Afghanistan will reach a tipping point and likely collapse.  
David Kilcullen, a renowned counterinsurgency author and analyst makes a similar 
assessment in his book The Accidental Guerilla, “All this field work has led me to the 
view that the Afghan campaign is at a strategic crossroads, and may indeed be 
                                                 
1  United States Dept. of the Army and United States Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 
Counterinsurgency 3-24 (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Dept. of the Army: Headquarters, Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command, Dept. of the Navy, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2006, 6–1.  
2  Ben Arnoldy, “Does US Commander’s Frank Assessment of Afghanistan Help – Or Hurt – War 
Effort?” The Christian Science Monitor, August 10, 2009;  George F. Will, “Time to Get Out of 
Afghanistan,” The Washington Post, September 1, 2009; “Asia: McChrystal in the Bull Ring; War and 
Politics in Afghanistan,” The Economist, September 5, 2009,  45;  Liam Stack, “Gates: US has One Year to 
make Progress in Afghanistan: American Public Won’t Tolerate Rising Death Tally for Long, Says US 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. A Helicopter Crashed Sunday, Killing 16 Civilians.” The Christian 
Science Monitor, July 19, 2009; Roxana Tiron, “Joint Chiefs Chairman: Afghanistan Getting Worse,” 
Leading the News: TheHill.Com (October 9, 2008). 
3  Jochen Vock, “Fact Sheet: Foreign Troops in Afghanistan.”; United States. Dept. of Defense, 
“Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan Report to Congress in Accordance with the 2008 
National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1230, Public Law 110-181),” Dept. of Defense. 
4  Jason H. Campbell and Jeremy Shapiro, “Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction 
& Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan,” Brookings (2009).  
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approaching a tipping point.”5  Once Afghanistan reaches this point it will require an 
exorbitant amount of money, men, and political will to salvage the government.  And 
after almost a decade of pouring lives and resources into a collapsing Afghanistan, it is 
very unlikely that the international community will have the fortitude to make the 
necessary commitments to save it.  Even now, several members of the coalition 
supporting the Kabul regime are beginning to question their commitment of precious 
blood and treasure to what appears to be a losing war.6 
Despite the Taliban’s own surge, the war is far from lost.  As with any other 
insurgency, the insurgency in Afghanistan is a zero sum competition between the 
insurgent (the Taliban) and the state (the Afghan government) for legitimacy, political 
power, and the support of the people.7  (See Figure 1.)  When the Taliban gain support, 
the Afghan government loses support and vice versa.  However, in order to reverse the 
trend in the state’s favor, the state must first identify and understand the needs of the 
Afghan people, and then do a better job of meeting those needs than the Taliban. 
 
                                                 
5  David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 46. 
6  Paul Weinberg, “Canada: Afghanistan Exit could Bring Escalated Air War,” Global Information 
Network (July 21, 2009); James Blitz and Daniel Dombey, “UK Agony Over Afghanistan Raises 
Washington Concerns,” Financial Times, July 16, 2009.  
7  Gordon H. McCormick, Steven B. Horton and Lauren A. Harrison, “Things Fall Apart: The 
Endgame Dynamics of Internal Wars,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007), 322.  
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Figure 1.   Afghan’s Perception of Government Performance8 
Understanding that the situation in Afghanistan appears bleak, the Afghan 
government and its coalition partners nonetheless possess greater strategic advantages 
than the Taliban, and if these are leveraged properly the state could cripple the Taliban 
movement.  The government’s first advantage in its struggle for legitimacy is the 
population’s negative perception of the Taliban.9  It is extremely difficult to defeat a 
popular movement; fortunately, for the Afghan government, the majority of Afghans 
have not forgotten the Taliban’s oppressive and dictatorial reign.10  This is especially 
evident in the Taliban’s recent efforts to recreate its image.  In July of 2009, Mullah 
Omar released a 13-chapter book outlining the proper conduct for Afghan Taliban.  Their 
new code of conduct emphasizes the necessity that every Taliban fighter must work to 
                                                 
8  Campbell and Shapiro, Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-
9/11 Afghanistan.  
9  Ibid.  
10  Sarah Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban (New York: Penguin 
Press, 2006);  V. Liebl, “Pushtuns, Tribalism, Leadership, Islam and Taliban: A Short View: REPORT 
FROM THE FIELD,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 18, no. 3 (September 2007), 492.  
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win over the local population.11  Additionally, Mullah Omar and the senior Taliban 
leaders are making efforts to change the Taliban name because of the negative 
connotations associated with it.  A recent senior Taliban official released the following 
statement to the press: “In our declarations or in statements by our leader Mullah 
Muhammad Omar, you would have noted the absence of the word Taliban.  Our 
leadership and shuras refer to our organization as Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and to 
our fighters as mujahideen.”12   
Second, approximately 76% of Afghans live in rural communities, and their level 
of expectation from the central government is minuscule.13  Very few rural Afghans have 
or have ever had electricity, cars, or the kind of infrastructure found in Western countries.  
As a result, most rural Afghans have little need for government services.  And, because 
the expectations of the state are so few, what the state needs to do to meet those needs is 
minimal.  This is of course dependent on the government recognizing the most critical 
needs of local Afghans, and addressing those needs in a meaningful way.   
Third, almost all politics in rural Afghanistan are local.14  While rural Afghans 
may have opinions about national politics and the Taliban insurgency, most rural 
Afghans are mainly concerned with the politics and internal conflicts within their own 
village.15  To many rural Afghans in villages like Shinkay, Maruf, Atghar, or Bolan, 
Kabul is as distant to them as is the capital of the United States.  This is an advantage for 
the state because national politics rarely affects local livelihood or even the legitimacy of 
the central government in the eyes of rural Afghans.   
Fourth, the Taliban are almost exclusively Pashtun, but Pashtuns are not 
exclusively Taliban.  Even though Pashtuns are the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, 
                                                 
11  Al Jazeera News, “Taliban Issue Code of Conduct,” Al Jazeera English Central/S. Asia (2009).  
12  Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Taliban Prefer Not to be Known as Taliban,” The News: International Top 
Stories (2009).  
13  Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA – World Factbook – Afghanistan.”  
14  T. Johnson and M. Mason, “All Counterinsurgency is Local,” The Atlantic Monthly 302, no. 3 
(October 2008), 36.  
15  U.S. Army, My Cousin’s Enemy is My Friend: A Study of Pashtun “Tribes” in Afghanistan (Fort 
Leavenworth, KS: Afghanistan Research Reachback Center White Paper: TRADOC G2 Human Terrain 
System (2009), 16.  
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they make up only 42% of the total population.16  While exact numbers or percentages 
are difficult to determine, the majority of Afghan Pashtuns oppose Taliban rule.17  
Finally, the Afghan government has the support and resources of the international 
community.18  This, and all of the above, should lead one to wonder: With so many 
advantages in the state’s favor, how is it that an unpopular insurgency has managed to 
bring the Afghan government and its coalition partners to the brink of collapse?  
Identifying what makes the Taliban successful may provide some answers and solutions 
for reversing their momentum. 
The Taliban have been most successful at gaining the support of rural Pashtuns.19  
Yet the Taliban’s success has not come from employing counterinsurgency techniques 
better than the Afghan government or coalition; Taliban success has come from 
understanding the local environment and tailoring strategy to the critical needs of each 
Pashtun community.  Compared to the coalition, the Taliban have very little to offer rural 
Afghans in term of services or resources.  They are not building roads or schools, drilling 
wells, providing medical services, or creating jobs.  The Taliban are instead gaining 
support because they are preserving the conservative Pashtun way of life and 
administering justice where government officials and police are corrupt.  The Taliban 
have wisely capitalized on the greatest failure of the Afghan government and its coalition 
partners.  This failure is the inability to field legitimate police that serve the interests of 
both local communities and the central government.20   
While the Taliban deserve some credit for their success, the Afghan government 
and the supporting international community have landed them this opportunity.  The 
                                                 
16  S. Harrison, “The Ethnic Split,” The Nation 289, no. 15 (Nov 9, 2009), 14, Central Intelligence 
Agency, CIA – World Factbook – Afghanistan. 
17  Bilal Baloch, “Getting Local to Defeat the Taliban,” Guardian.Co.Uk (2009); The nation: The 
Dreyfuss report, May 12, 2009;  Ruth Rennie, Sudhindra Sharma and Pawan Sen, Afghanistan in 2008: A 
Survey of the Afghan People (Kabul Afghanistan: The Asia Foundation, 2008).  
18  Andrew J. Bacevich, “Is Obama ‘all in’ on Afghanistan?” Los Angeles Times, September 7, 2009.  
19 Mark Moyar, A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (New Haven 
& London: Yale University Press, 2009), 197.  
20  Anthony H. Cordesman et al., “Winning in Afghanistan Creating Effective Afghan Security 
Forces,” Center for Strategic & International Studies. 
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Afghan government and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) have failed to 
establish legitimate government services that support the people and thereby address the 
root causes that the Taliban use to gain support.21  The Taliban are gaining support today 
in the same way they came to power in 1994, by dispensing justice and eliminating 
corruption in rural areas.  At the opposite end of the spectrum, the Afghan government 
appears to embrace corruption, while the police, who are responsible for enforcing justice 




Figure 2.   Afghan’s Perception of Corruption among Government Officials and Police23 
 
                                                 
21  A. Jalali, “Winning in Afghanistan,” Parameters 39, no. 1 (Spring 2009), 5.  
22  Graf J. Lambsdorf., “Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2008,” Andrew 
Legon, “Ineffective, Unprofessional, and Corrupt: The Afghan National Police Challenge,” Foreign Policy 
Research Institute (June 2009). 
23  Campbell and Shapiro, Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in 
Post-9/11 Afghanistan. 
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Although there is no single solution for victory in Afghanistan, some 
counterinsurgency precepts are more critical than others, particularly those regarding the 
police.  The police in Afghanistan should be capable of representing legitimate 
governance, providing security, and addressing many of the fundamental issues that the 
Taliban use to garner support.  It should not be the Taliban that provide justice and 
security in many parts of rural Afghanistan.24  According to a recent report by the United 
States Institute of Peace, “In 2008, public opinion polls showed that Afghans considered 
the absence of public security… as the primary problem facing the country.”25   
Acknowledging that the police are not a panacea, this thesis explains why a 
competent and legitimate police force is key to reversing Taliban influence.  This thesis 
will argue that: 
1) The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the 
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) need to make the 
Afghan National Police their number one priority for resources and manpower. 
2) The Afghan National Police must be fundamentally restructured in 
accordance with traditional and cultural precepts to meet the needs of rural 
Afghan communities. 
Unless the coalition makes the Afghan National Police a top priority and 
fundamentally restructures the organization to meet the needs of rural communities, the 
Taliban will continue to gain influence and legitimacy in Afghanistan’s critical periphery.  
Legitimate police are vital because they are the only government security force that 
maintains a permanent presence in rural Afghanistan, where the majority of 
Afghanistan’s people reside and the Taliban are strongest. 
The Afghan National Police is a resource-intensive, top-down organization that 
serves to support the government and not the people.  The case this thesis will make is 
that the Afghan National Police needs to be fundamentally restructured into a bottom-up 
                                                 
24  Peter Graff, “Afghans Turn to Taliban in Fear of Own Police,” Reuters, July 12, 2009;   Richard A. 
Oppel Jr., “Corruption Undercuts U.S. Hopes for Improving Afghan Police,” New York Times, April 9, 
2009.  
25  Robert K. Perito, “Afghanistan’s Police: The Weak Link in Security Sector Reform,” United States 
Institute of Peace, Special Report 227 (2009), 8. 
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organization wherein police have direct ties to the community and are selected and vetted 
by local elders.  Including the community in the police selection process would foster 
legitimacy, accountability, and a mutual support network that would reduce resource 
requirements.  Perhaps even more importantly, a bottom-up approach would help ensure 
police meet the needs of both the people and government. 
The subsequent chapters explain the approach I am taking, describe the vital role 
police play in counterinsurgency, and make the point that if the government mismanages 
them, police can do more harm than good.  The chapters to follow examine the historic 
responsibilities of police in Afghanistan and consider why the Afghan people and the 
international community regard the current Afghan National Police to be a failure.  The 
thesis then explores how to transition the Afghan National Police into a viable and trusted 
branch of the government.   
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II. METHODOLOGY AND PERSONAL BACKGROUND  
We have had the greatest success in Afghanistan ironically, on the front 
line.  U.S. and Coalition brigades and battalions who live in the heart of 
Afghan communities have, for the most part, developed an intimate 
understanding of the communities they support.26 
A. CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING EQUALS FRONT LINE SUCCESS 
I selected the Afghan National Police as the topic for my thesis prior to arriving at 
the Naval Postgraduate School.  The inspiration for my decision came from a 
combination of personal experiences and interactions with local police, national police, 
the Afghan National Army (ANA), government officials, and rural Afghans.  This 
experience was spread out over a four-year period, between 2003 and 2007, over the 
course of which I spent almost two years living in Afghanistan.  Given my experiences, 
observations, and lessons learned, I left Afghanistan convinced that Afghan police were 
the linchpin to a successful counterinsurgency campaign.  A significant portion of my 
Afghan experience came from my service as a Special Forces Operational Detachment 
Alpha (ODA) Commander in 2004.27 
It was during this deployment that I developed a true appreciation for rural 
Pashtun culture and the need to tailor civil and military operations to the local 
environment.  Additionally, that particular deployment led me to want to learn more 
about the Afghan people, their wonderfully unique culture, and their tragic struggle to 
live in peace.   
                                                 
26  Andrew Garfield, “What Afghans Want,” Foreign Policy Research Institute (2009), 2. 
27 “Special Forces groups are organized in small teams of 12 men — a.k.a. Operational Detachment 
Alpha (ODA). A typical Green Beret’s Team structure usually consists of two each of the following: 
Weapons Sergeants, Communications Sergeants, Medical Sergeants and Engineering Sergeants. A 
Commander, Assistant Commander (Warrant Officer), Operations/Intelligence Sergeant and Non-
Commissioned Officer In Charge (NCOIC) complete the team. These teams can change according to the 
type of mission.”  U.S. Army, “GoArmy.Com Special Forces Team Members.”   
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My passion for the Afghan plight developed while living among rural Pashtuns 
and with our ANA counterparts.28  It was in the village and district of Shinkay, located in 
the southeast region of Zabul Province, where I began to learn about the distinct roles the 
police and army play.  In Shinkay, we also slept, ate, laughed, fought, and gradually 
developed lasting relationships with many of the local Afghans, who were almost 
exclusively Ghilzai Pashtuns from the Hotak tribe.  Additionally, we learned a 
tremendous amount from the eclectic assortment of rural and urban Afghans in the ANA 
companies we partnered with.  ANA personnel maintained excellent relationships with 
the local villagers; they attended the weekly shuras (community council), shopped at the 
local bazaar, attended the local mosque, assisted the police with security, and helped 
resolve local disputes.  I never once received a single complaint about an ANA soldier 
abusing or threatening local villagers.  One reason ANA soldiers behaved so 
benevolently was the fear of reprisal from their Pashtun commander. 
Although the ANA soldiers had good relations with the district chief, local police, 
and members of the community, they were never fully accepted as part of the community.  
Despite the soldiers’ Afghan ties to the rural Pashtuns of Shinkay, they were almost as 
foreign as were we Americans.  The community held the ANA soldiers in high regard 
and benefited from their presence, but the local Afghans always considered them to be 
temporary outsiders.  There were two main reasons why the Afghans in Shinkay never 
fully accepted or trusted the ANA.  First, the Afghan National Army never maintained a 
permanent local presence.  The ANA companies would rotate about every two to three 
months, which meant new soldiers had to rebuild what little trust or friendships their 
predecessors previously fostered.  Second, and even more critical was the soldiers’ lack 
of local family ties.  Without family ties, ANA soldiers lacked the intimate relations 
required to truly understand the local politics, local history, and clan dynamics. 
                                                 
28 During the 2004 deployment, we partnered with three different Afghan National Army (ANA) 
companies.  ANA companies are organized similarly to U.S. Infantry companies with a captain and three to 
four lieutenants, and approximately 120 enlisted men.  Of the three companies we were partnered with, two 
had Pashtun commanders and one had a Tajik commander.  The majority of soldiers in all three companies 
were Tajik with a minority of Hazara and Pashtun soldiers. 
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Local policemen, on the other hand, were born, raised, and had family ties in the 
community, and although the police in Shinkay were poorly trained, poorly equipped, 
and illiterate, they were not corrupt.  Customary laws, or their code of honor (know as 
Pashtunwali), prevented the local police from abusing or extorting members of their 
community.29  It was this tribal code of honor that kept the Shinkay police accountable to 
their families and community. 
Additionally, the police knew where every person in the community lived and 
worked, and what their social standing was in the community.  Whenever we needed to 
question an individual from the area, the police could tell us where he lived, and where 
his immediate family lived.  The police would take us to the person’s house and facilitate 
a meeting with him or one of his male relatives.  Having the local police arrive first at the 
house, helped put the family and community at ease and helped us to get the information 
we needed—without driving a wedge between the community and the central 
government’s counterinsurgency force.   
Although it was clear to us that loyalties were to their tribe, this did not make the 
local police less effective law enforcement agents, or enemies of the state.  On the 
contrary, their loyalty to the tribe made them legitimate and trusted as government 
officials.  Additionally, their local ties facilitated the development of symbiotic 
relationships between the community and the national government, which would not have 
been possible had the police been brought in from outside the community.  In our case, it 
was in the best interests of the tribe for the local police to work with the ANA and the 
central government to either convince the Taliban to reconcile with the tribe, or drive 
them out of the area.   
                                                 
29 Pashtunwali is an unwritten, yet strictly adhered to moral code that governs social behavior and is 
used to preserve order among Pashtun communities.  It also maintains that every Pashtun is equal and that 
disputes are resolved through a shura or jirga;  Shuras or Jirgas are assemblies of tribal elders brought 
together for various purposes – waging war, composing peace, and to adjudicate tribal or inter-tribal affairs 
or disputes;  “Pashtunwali that is the source of abstract principles.  Rules that generate behavior embody 
the notion of “doing Pashto” that is, enacting cultural values in the real world where they take on specific 
forms.  It is the last area that is most concrete because actions taken by individuals become subject to 
public judgment.” Thomas Barfield, Culture and Custom in Nation-Building: Law in Afghanistan, Vol. 60 
(Portland, ME: University of Maine, School of Law, 2008), 356.  
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Unfortunately, on this rotation I did not yet fully appreciate the importance of the 
police in COIN, and concentrated most of my ODA’s efforts and resources on improving 
the ANA.  It was not until midway through my third deployment that I was convinced 
that the police deserved to be the major focus of our efforts and were key to defeating the 
Taliban in Afghanistan’s critical rural periphery. 
During my third deployment, in 2005–06, I had two experiences with the Afghan 
National Police that led me to question the logic behind creating a large national police 
force in lieu of supporting local police.  The first experience occurred when I was tasked 
with assisting the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force—Afghanistan’s 
(CJSOTF-A) Commander—with demobilizing the Afghan Security Guards (ASG), 
which were the U.S. Special Forces private militia forces.30  The CJSOTF-A 
Commander, COL Patrick Higgins, arranged to present the ASG with awards for their 
valorous service to their country and to recognize their dedication to U.S. Special Forces.  
COL Higgins also arranged to have an ANA and an Afghan National Police recruiter 
present at the demobilization ceremony.  That way, if a member of the ASG agreed to 
join either organization, the U.S. government would award him a $500 signing bonus.  
The average monthly salary of an ASG was $700 a month, while the starting salary of a 
soldier in the ANA or soldier in the Afghan National Police was about $150 a month.   
When the ASG were told that they would be earning one-fifth of their normal 
salary, they began discussing among themselves the merits of joining the police or army.  
It turned out that the majority of the soldiers who signed up for service joined the Afghan 
National Police.  When I asked my interpreter Kahlil, who was a former ASG, why none 
of the ASG wanted to join the army, which I thought would be better suited for them, he 
                                                 
30 “Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) is a task force composed of special 
operations units from one or more foreign countries and more than one US Military Department formed to 
carry out a specific special operation or prosecute special operations in support of a theater campaign or 
other operations.  The combined joint special operations task force may have conventional nonspecial 
operations units assigned or attached to support the conduct of specific missions.” Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Washington DC, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” Ft. Belvoir 
Defense Technical Information Center;  The Afghan Security Guards (ASG) were Afghan militia forces 
employed and trained by U.S. Army Special Forces to provide local security and assist in 
counterinsurgency operations.  The ASG were originally referred to as Afghan Security Forces (ASF), and 
in 2004, their name was changed to ASG to better characterize their shift from an offensive role in 
counterinsurgency/counter terrorism, to a defensive role of providing security. 
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replied that they were joining the Afghan National Police because they knew they could 
make up the difference in pay through bribes and extortion.  I recognized at that moment 
that even though we were enlisting thousands of well-trained Afghans into a national 
police force, we were at the same time weakening the government and actually creating a 
less stable and less secure environment for the Afghan people.  This was a prime example 
of how simply increasing the quantity of police can actually make the security situation 
worse.   
While I did not agree with what the ASG were doing, I understood their 
reasoning.  Almost every single ASG had left his own community with his father’s 
blessing, and was expected to earn money and glory for the family at the expense of other 
tribes or communities.  The security guards viewed the Afghan National Police as another 
venue for elevating their family’s economic and social status while simultaneously 
weakening rival clans. 
My second illuminating experience with the Afghan National Police occurred 
when we were sent into the Tagab Valley to secure the polling sites for the 2005 
parliamentary elections.  There had been some recent Taliban attacks around Tagab and 
the Governor of Kapisa was concerned about security for the elections.  A small group of 
U.S. Special Operations Forces and a company of ANA entered the valley.  As we 
entered the valley, we came across a police checkpoint manned by two Afghan National 
Police soldiers.  I immediately got out of my vehicle and asked the Afghan National 
Police soldiers who the village elder or headman was and where we could find him.  The 
Afghan National Police soldiers responded with blank stares and a simple, “We don’t 
know.”  I was totally taken aback.  How could an Afghan cop perform his duties without 
even knowing who the community leaders were?  After a few more questions and even 
fewer answers, one of them took me to meet his commanding officer, who was inside an 
abandoned girls’ school about 100 meters off the main road.   
Inside the school, there were about a half dozen Afghan National Police soldiers 
sitting together in a small room, drinking tea.  I addressed the commander and asked him 
the same questions:  Who were the village elders and where could we find them?  I asked 
him what he knew about the recent Taliban attacks in the area, and about the attitude of 
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the people concerning the upcoming elections.  Shockingly, the commander could not 
answer a single question.  Slightly disturbed by his lack of concern for the community, I 
told him we were in Tagab at the request of the governor who was concerned about 
security.  I rhetorically asked him if he was in charge of security.  To that question, the 
Afghan National Police commander did respond: “I provide security by manning this 
checkpoint.” 
It was obvious to me then that the Afghan National Police in Tagab had no 
interest in establishing any ties with the community or in leaving their secure post to 
provide security, administer justice, or resolve any disputes. They were, therefore, a 
useless police force.  That night, a heavily armed force of Taliban attacked our element.  
The next morning the Afghan National Police commander came to me and boasted, “The 
Taliban were not afraid to attack you, and you have machineguns and the Afghan Army 
with you.  What do you think they would do to us, just nine men with Kalashnikovs?”  
After this conversation, I still had little respect for the Afghan National Police 
commander, but I did sympathize with his situation, and had a better understanding of the 
difficulties faced by a small isolated Afghan National Police unit that did not have the 
community’s support. 
We returned to the Tagab Valley several times during that deployment, and each 
time the Afghan National Police soldiers we dealt with previously had been replaced with 
a different crew.  With this rapid turnover, the Afghan National Police had no incentive 
to develop any relationships with the community.  And, because the Afghan National 
Police did not have a stake in Tagab’s community, they simply barricaded themselves 
inside their compound and waited for their replacements.   
Although these experiences are only anecdotal, they convinced me that an 
illegitimate and corrupt police force is Afghanistan’s greatest security threat.  That then 
became the impetus for this thesis. 
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III. POLICE AND AFGHANISTAN’S COUNTERINSURGENCY 
(COIN) 
Intelligence operations that help detect terrorist insurgents for arrest and 
prosecution are the single most important practice to protect a population 
from threats to its security.  Honest, trained, robust police forces 
responsible for security can gather intelligence at the community level.31 
Most counterinsurgency experts agree that a legitimate and effective police force 
is better suited than the military for defeating insurgencies.32  Even the U.S. Army’s 
Counterinsurgency (COIN) manual states clearly that the police, not the military, are the 
front line soldiers in a counterinsurgency.33  As David Galula points out, the police are 
the government’s most effective and efficient organization for eradicating insurgent 
political agents from the population.34  But, despite such acknowledgement of the 
importance of police, it has been the ANA that has received the lion’s share of resources 
and attention.  This disproportionate allocation of resources and training has negatively 
impacted both the competency of the Afghan National Police, and the legitimacy of the 
central government.35  Because the police are so visible and spread out, their actions have 
the greatest potential to either support or thwart government legitimacy.  
                                                 
31  Kalev I. Sepp, “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (October 2006), 9. 
32  Seth G. Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (Santa Monica: RAND National Defense 
Research Institute, 2008), 157; United States. Dept. of the Army and United States. Marine Corps Combat 
Development Command, Counterinsurgency;  Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative (U.S.), “U.S. 
Government Counterinsurgency Guide,” United States Government Interagency Counterinsurgency 
Initiative;  Jason Campbell and others, Assessing Counterinsurgency and Stabilization Missions 
(Washington, DC: Foreign Policy at Brookings, 2009), 27.  
33  United States. Dept. of the Army and United States. Marine Corps Combat Development 
Command, Counterinsurgency, 282.  
34  David Galula and John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (Westport, CT: 
Praeger Security International, 2006), 86. 
35  North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Public Diplomacy Division, “Afghanistan Report 2009,” 
NATO Public Diplomacy Division;   United States Government Accountability Office, Washington DC 
and others, “Afghanistan Security: U.S. Efforts to Develop Capable Afghan Police Forces Face Challenges 
and Need a Coordinated, Detailed Plan to Help Ensure Accountability,” Defense Technical Information 
Center, 15. 
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While projecting government legitimacy is essential in a counterinsurgency, the 
police also have the equally important job of protecting the population from lawlessness 
and insurgent violence.  According to the U.S. Counterinsurgency Guide, a COIN effort 
is successful when: 
The affected government is seen as legitimate, controlling social, political, 
economic, and security institutions that meet the population’s needs, 
including adequate mechanisms to address the grievances that may have 
fueled support of the insurgency.36  
Applying this as a prescription for success, we can see that the police are 
responsible for much more than just law enforcement in COIN.  This becomes especially 
true in rural Afghanistan where the police are often the only government representatives 
present.  In these cases, the police are not only responsible for security, they are expected 
to address community grievances and facilitate dispute resolution.   
In order for the police to effectively meet the needs of the people, there must be 
reciprocal trust.37  Legitimate and trusted police are able to develop grassroots security 
by working with the community.  These mutually beneficial local security nets are then in 
place to support the police when a more powerful insurgent force threatens the 
community.38  According to the International Crisis Group, “If police reform in 
Afghanistan is to succeed, the goal should be the creation of a trusted, civilian service, 
which enforces—and is accountable to—the rule of law.”39  One hallmark of a trusted 
police force is that the police interact with the population on a daily basis, forging 
ongoing relations with key members of the community.  Through these daily interactions 
and relationships police develop intimate knowledge of the physical and human terrain.   
 
 
                                                 
36  Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative (U.S.), U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, 60, 
16. 
37  Karen S. Cook, Trust in Society (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001), 403. 
38  Jones, Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 116. 
39  International Crisis Group, “Reforming Afghanistan’s Police,” no. 138, Asia Report, August 30, 
2007, ii. 
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This in turn makes them far better than the military at developing the intelligence 
networks needed to identify and locate insurgents before they have a chance to burrow in 
and establish footholds.40 
As previously noted, despite the many benefits to be garnered by developing a 
robust, professional police force, the police in Afghanistan have received significantly 
less money, training, equipment, and emphasis than the ANA.  The coalition nations 
supporting Afghanistan’s Security Sector Reform (SSR) have focused the majority of 
their efforts on building a strong national army and little on building a capable and 
legitimate police force.  According to the International Crisis Group, “…60 percent of 
SSR spending in 2003/2004–2004/2005 went to the ANA, just 28 percent to the Afghan 
National Police and law enforcement.”41  (See Figure 3)  
While these figures represent funds spent on the organizations, even more telling 
is the disproportionate number of personnel dedicated to developing the ANA and 
Afghan National Police.  Germany, which was the “lead” nation for training, equipping, 
and developing the Afghan National Police provided just over 40 police trainers, while 
the U.S., the “lead” nation for the ANA, stood up an entire task force to train the Afghan 
Army. 42  Early in 2003, the U.S. put a Major General in charge of the 300-man Task 
Force Phoenix, the organization tasked with training and equipping the ANA.43  
Afghanistan and the international community are still feeling the negative effects of 
neglecting Afghanistan’s police.  According to Anthony Cordesman, “…the Afghan 
National Police development effort has been a major failure and one that has gravely 
undercut the chances for victory.”44 
 
                                                 
40  Sepp, Best Practices in Counterinsurgency, 8. 
41  International Crisis Group, Reforming Afghanistan’s Police, i, 6. 
42  Andrew Wilder, “Cops Or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan Police,” Afghanistan 
Research and Evaluation Unit (July 2007), I;  International Crisis Group, Reforming Afghanistan’s Police, 
i. 
43  Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix, “Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix Web Page”;  John Pike, 
“Camp Phoenix,” Global Security.org (2009).  
44  Cordesman et al., Winning in Afghanistan Creating Effective Afghan Security Forces, 96. 
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Figure 3.   U.S. Dollars Spent in Millions on the ANA and ANP45 
One can only speculate about what Afghanistan would look like today had the 
international community put as much emphasis on building a quality police force as the 
U.S. put into building the national army.  Arguably, this has been a major contributor to 
the fact that the insurgency in Afghanistan is gaining momentum while the people’s 
confidence in the GIRoA is declining.46  Another major factor affecting both the 
insurgency and the government’s legitimacy is clearly corruption.47  (See Figure 4.) 
 
                                                 
45  Campbell and Shapiro, Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in 
Post-9/11 Afghanistan. 
46  Ibid. 
47  Ali Wardak, Daus Saba and Halima Kazem, “Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007: 
Bridging Modernity and Tradition: Rule of Law and the Search for Justice,” Center for Policy and Human 




Figure 4.   Afghanistan’s Corruption and State Weakness48 
Systemic corruption in the Afghan National Police has seriously undermined the 
GIRoA’s struggle to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people.49  According to 
anthropologist Thomas Barfield, corruption is rendering the central government 
ineffective: 
Because residents of rural Afghanistan generally considered the 
government officials of all types corrupt and oppressive, there is a strong 
desire to avoid both government officials and the formal legal system.50 
Not only does corruption weaken the central government, it creates opportunities 
for insurgents to generate support from a disenfranchised population.   
                                                 
48  Campbell and Shapiro, Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in 
Post-9/11 Afghanistan. 
49  Programs for Culture & Conflict Studies, “Summary of the Afghan National Police (ANP),” 
Programs for Culture & Conflict Studies, Naval Postgraduate School.  
50  Barfield, Culture and Custom in Nation-Building: Law in Afghanistan, 361. 
 20
Major General Richard L. Clutterbuck, a senior member of the Malayan 
government from 1956–58, noted that police corruption had severe effects on the 
government’s efforts to influence the population during the Malayan insurgency:  
Where [the police were corrupt], and made a live-and-let-live deal, that 
village became a Communist village, without any option, and every man, 
woman, and child in the village knew it.  That was how the Communists 
usually started an oil spot, not by a spectacular capture of the village by 
armed guerrillas.51 
Police corruption not only undermines the government’s legitimacy, but it has 
actually motivated numerous formerly pro-government Afghans to denounce the 
government and join the Taliban.52 
Evidence suggests that a large percentage of Afghan National Police extort, rob, 
and abuse the very people they are charged with protecting.53  Research Fellow Antonio 
Giustozzi argues that Afghan police have done more to support the insurgency than to 
counter it: 
In terms of the direct impact of the police on the counter-insurgency 
effort, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the indiscipline and 
corruption of Afghan security services, including the police, was a 
contributing factor to the insurgency.54 
 
                                                 
51  Richard L. Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War; Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam (New 
York: Praeger, 1966), 49. 
52  Tiron, “Joint Chiefs Chairman: Afghanistan Getting Worse.” Anthony Loyd, “Corruption, Bribes 
and Trafficking: A Cancer that Es Engulfing Afghanistan,” TIMESONLINE (2007);  Campbell and Shapiro, 
Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-9/11 Afghanistan;  Lambsdorf, 
Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2008; Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The 
US and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking, 
2008). 
53  Programs for Culture & Conflict Studies, Summary of the Afghan National Police (ANP), 5; Legon, 
Ineffective, Unprofessional, and Corrupt: The Afghan National Police Challenge;  Sayed Ibrahimi  Y., 
“Afghan Police Part of the Problem: Corruption in the Law-Enforcement Service has Become so Endemic 
that a Provincial Governor has Decided to Speak Out.” Institute for War & Peace Reporting (2006);  
Oppel, Corruption Undercuts U.S. Hopes for Improving Afghan Police, A.1. 
54  Antonio Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan, 
2002–7 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 174. 
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When the police fail to uphold their social contract, and abuse their authority, 
Afghans, especially rural Afghans, seek alternative means by which to protect their 
families and livelihood.  The Afghan National Police’s illegal activities contribute 
directly to an environment unfavorable for the GIRoA and conducive to the Taliban.55  
                                                 
55  Graff, Afghans Turn to Taliban in Fear of Own Police, 1–2. 
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IV. OVERVIEW OF AFGHANISTAN’S NATIONAL POLICE 
Police in Afghanistan have always been seen as a coercive instrument of 
the state rather than public servants upholding - and bound by - the rule of 
law, a view exacerbated by the years of conflict.  Control of the security 
organs, including the police, has been considered one of the spoils of 
war.56 
A. ORIGINS OF THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE 
Afghanistan was founded over 260 years ago. For the first 200 years, shariat 
(Islamic law) and customary law (tribal or community social codes) dominated the 
Afghan landscape, and local religious and tribal militias principally enforced laws.57  The 
concept of a national secular police force is relatively new.  Zahir Shah, the last king of 
Afghanistan, created a national police force in the 1960s to enforce the state legal codes 
and provide security for citizens and visiting foreigners.58  Even after receiving support 
from Germany, and later from the Soviet Union, Afghanistan never developed a very 
powerful or effective national police force.59   
While the initial responsibility of Afghanistan’s national police was civic, its role 
changed after the 1979 Soviet invasion.  The national police under Afghanistan’s 
communist party, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), morphed into a 
secretive paramilitary arm of the government, more focused on protecting the regime 
than the people.60  With the Soviet Union’s assistance, the KGB transformed the national 
                                                 
56  International Crisis Group, Reforming Afghanistan’s Police, i, 1. 
57  Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present [Révolution afghane.] 
(New York: Columbia University Press in association with the Centre d’études et de recherches 
internationales, Paris, 2005); Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central 
Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 83. Barfield, Culture and Custom in Nation-Building: Law 
in Afghanistan. 
58  Wardak, Saba and Kazem, Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007: Bridging Modernity and 
Tradition: Rule of Law and the Search for Justice. 
59  Wilder, Cops Or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan Police, i. 
60  International Crisis Group, Reforming Afghanistan’s Police, i, 2. 
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police into a feared secret police known as Khedamat-i Ittala’at-i Daulati (KHAD).61  As 
a brutal and coercive arm of the PDPA, the KHAD concentrated more on seeking out and 
eliminating political opposition than providing police services or enforcing the rule of 
law.62  The national police remained a secretive paramilitary force distrusted by many 
Afghans until the fall off Kabul in 1992.  Unfortunately, this was the last image many 
Afghans had of a uniform-wearing national police force. 
B. THE RISE OF THE TALIBAN: THE PROMOTION OF VIRTUE AND 
PREVENTION OF VICE 
The collapse of Mohammed Najibullah’s communist regime in 1992 left 
Afghanistan without a functioning central government or a police force capable of 
establishing a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.  The mujahidin alliance that 
governed in the communists’ wake initially exercised limited de facto control over the 
Afghan people until their infighting over leadership and ethnicity tore the alliance apart.63  
According to journalist Ahmed Rashid, the mujahidin-era police were more or less thugs 
bent on extorting from the people and enforcing the will of whoever was their local 
commander: 
During the civil war in the 1990s police stations were nothing more than 
an extension of the power of local commanders and warlords…Justice was 
rarely meted out, and the police – lacking salaries or facilities –lived off 
the land by exploiting the public rather than serving it.64 
In the absence of unified power, a myriad of strongmen surfaced to seize local 
power.  Between the years 1992 and 1996, anarchy reigned and large portions of 
                                                 
61  Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present, 177. 
62  Fida Mohammad and Paul Conway, “Justice and Law Enforcement in Afghanistan Under the 
Taliban: How Much is Likely to Change?” Policing 26, no. 1 (2003), 162; Connie M. Koski, “Afghanistan 
at a Crossroads: The Quest for Democratic Policing in a Post-9/11 Era,” Police Practice & and Research 
(August 2009), 317. 
63  Wardak, Saba and Kazem, Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007: Bridging Modernity and 
Tradition: Rule of Law and the Search for Justice. 
64  Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The US and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
and Central Asia, 204. 
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Afghanistan descended into chaos.65  The heightened violence and lack of government- 
provided security forced many Afghans to rely exclusively on family or solidarity groups 
known as aqwam (a solidarity group based on descent or locality) for protection and 
justice.66  
By 1994, corruption, lawlessness, and instability in Southern Afghanistan reached 
a tipping point.  According to myth, a predatory warlord kidnapped, raped, and held two 
teenage girls as slaves.  Family members of the two young girls went to Mullah 
Mohammed Omar’s madrassa (Islamic school) to seek his aid.   In response, Mullah 
Omar mustered a few weapons and 30 of his loyal talibs (religious students) who then 
attacked the warlord’s compound, killing him, and freeing the girls.67  Mullah Omar’s 
impulsive act of justice bolstered his legitimacy in the eyes of the community and 
catalyzed the Taliban movement.  The Afghan people initially welcomed the Taliban as 
liberators and peacekeepers:  
This is the one deed for which the black-turbaned militiamen are to this 
day remembered with gratitude in Kandahar.  They rid the countryside of 
the vultures that were picking the very marrow from its shattered bones.68 
Support for the Taliban grew, as they did not immediately demand power or 
positions in government.  The Taliban’s altruistic intentions, however, turned out to be 
short-lived.  As the Taliban’s influence spread, so did its control over the population.  
The Taliban became uncompromising, hierarchal, and dictatorial, forcing all Afghans to 
adhere to their strict Salafist interpretation of Islamic law.69  By 1996, the Taliban 
conquered Kabul along with most of Afghanistan.  In the course of their conquest, the 
Taliban imposed and brutally enforced a radical interpretation of sharia through the 
Department of the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice.  Enforcers working 
                                                 
65  Mohammad and Conway, Justice and Law Enforcement in Afghanistan Under the Taliban: How 
Much is Likely to Change? 162. 
66  Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present, 10. 
67  Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, 25. 
68  Sarah Chayes, The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan After the Taliban (New York: 
Penguin Press, 2006), 73. 
69  Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. 
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directly for the Department of the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, 
dispensing Taliban justice, were known as the religious police.  The Taliban’s police 
force consisted of thousands of young Pashtun men, many of whom had grown up in 
Pakistani refugee camps, educated only about Islam.  The young zealots patrolled the 
streets and countryside with whips and Kalashnikovs, doling out punishment without any 
threat of reprisal.70  From 1996 to 2001, the Taliban’s religious police meted out most of 
Afghanistan’s law and order.   
The history of Afghanistan’s policing prior to 9/11 can best be described as 
having been rife with inequity.  Political, ethnic, and religious discord coupled with over 
two decades of internal strife created an environment that was not conducive to the 
development of transparent and accountable police.71 
C. THE REBIRTH OF SECULAR NATIONAL POLICE  
With U.S. and coalition assistance, the Northern Alliance toppled the Taliban in 
late 2001.  Immediately following the fall of the Taliban, the United Nations hosted a 
summit in December 2001 in Bonn, Germany to establish who would govern 
Afghanistan.72  With the United Nations arbitrating, the victorious Afghan political 
factions founded the provisional arrangements by which Afghanistan would establish 
permanent governmental institutions.73  The purpose of the Bonn process was to establish 
a foundation for Afghanistan’s future political process and institutions of governance.74  
In addition to setting transitional benchmarks, the Bonn Agreement established an 
Interim government responsible for ruling Afghanistan for the first six months until a 
                                                 
70  Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. 
71 Connie M. Koski, “Afghanistan at a Crossroads: The Quest for Democratic Policing in a Post-9/11 
Era,” Police Practice & and Research, August 2009, 317. 
72  United Nations “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-
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73  Wilder, Cops Or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan Police, i, 3. 
74  Thomas H. Johnson and Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA Dept of National Security 
Affairs, “Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building After War,” Defense 
Technical Information Center. 
 27
Loya Jirga could be convened to nominate a Transitional Authority.75  The delegates of 
the Bonn Agreement selected Hamid Karzai, a prominent Southern Pashtun, as the 
Chairman of the Interim Authority, along with 30 interim cabinet members to support 
him.  The cabinet members who were primarily responsible for running the state were 
comprised mainly of members of the Northern Alliance.76 
Although charged with leading and rebuilding Afghanistan’s war torn society, 
Karzai’s government did not have legitimate security forces to protect the people or 
thwart lawlessness and violence.  Afghanistan was once again a country incapable of 
establishing a monopoly on the lawful use of violence.  In an attempt to prevent the 
anarchy and chaos that persisted in the early 1990s, several countries set out to help 
Afghanistan develop its own justice and security system.   
D. GERMANY TAKES THE LEAD IN REBUILDING AFGHANISTAN’S 
NATIONAL POLICE  
Germany, whose relationship with the Afghan police predates the Soviet invasion, 
volunteered to take the lead in rebuilding Afghanistan’s police force.77  In February 2002, 
Germany hosted a conference in Berlin to generate international support for instituting a 
national Afghan police force.  Donor nations agreed that the composition and role of the 
Afghan National Police should be, “a multiethnic, sustainable, and countrywide 62,000-
member professional police service that is fully committed to the rule of law.”78  The 
partner nations settled on 62,000 as a suitable number for the Afghan National Police, 
based on formulas involving population figures and fiscal sustainability.79 
                                                 
75  Johnson and Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA Dept of National Security Affairs, 
“Afghanistan’s Post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building After War,” 3. 
76  Ibid., 4. 
77  International Crisis Group, Reforming Afghanistan’s Police, i, 6. 
78  United States. Government Accountability Office et al., “Afghanistan Security Efforts to Establish 
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Germany wasted no time in instituting a plan for developing the Afghan National 
Police.  In less than a month, Germany signed a Seat and Status Agreement with the 
Afghan Interim Government’s Ministry of Interior, appointed a special Ambassador, and 
deployed approximately 40 police advisors to Kabul.   The Seat and Status Agreement 
outlined the following duties of the German Police Project Office in Kabul: 
1. Advising the Afghan security authorities in an effort to 
rebuild an Afghan police force that is bound by rule-of-law 
principles and has a respect for human rights. 
2. Assisting in the training of police recruits. 
3.   Assisting in the setting up of a police academy. 
4.   Implementing bilateral police funding assistance. 
5.   Coordinating the international support for the establishment 
of the Afghan police force.80 
 
Germany’s role as lead nation for the development of Afghanistan’s police was 
formalized in April 2002, when the Interim Afghan government met with the United 
States, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom in Geneva, Switzerland to 
designate Security Sector Reform (SSR) responsibilities for Afghanistan.81  The five 
supporting nations each agreed to take the “lead” on one single security sector.  The 
United States was designated lead nation for rebuilding Afghanistan’s Army; the United 
Kingdom was to manage counter-narcotics; Japan would be responsible for disarmament, 
demilitarization, and reintegration (DDR); Italy would work on Afghanistan’s justice 
system; and Germany maintained primacy for rebuilding Afghanistan’s National 
Police.82  With this division of labor built, Germany moved forward to reestablish 
Afghanistan’s national police force.  
Germany focused its initial efforts on training senior police officers and restoring 
the National Police Academy in Kabul.  Germany viewed police leadership as the 
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backbone of the Afghan National Police, and therefore dedicated the majority of its 
resources to training commissioned and noncommissioned officers (NCO) in a program 
similar to that used to train German police.83  Commissioned officers were required to 
complete twelfth-grade prior to entering the academy’s three-year program of instruction, 
while NCOs were required to complete ninth-grade prior to entering the academy’s nine-
month program of instruction.84  By January 2005, three years after its inception, only 41 
commissioned officers and 2,583 NCOs had completed Germany’s full program of 
instruction.85  The inadequate number of trained police was partially due to Germany’s 
limited resource inputs.  Between 2002 and 2007, Germany contributed a paltry $80 
million to support Afghan National Police development.  In contrast, in the first two years 
of training the ANA, the U.S. contributed over five times that amount, and from 2002 to 
2007, the U.S. contributed over $13.6 billion to developing Afghanistan’s security 
forces.86 
Furthermore, Germany had to deal with the complicated task of trying to build a 
nonpartisan professional police force accountable to all Afghans and the central 
government.  This proved extremely difficult in a country that had just been through a 
bitter ethnic war.  With the Northern Alliance emerging victorious, many Northern 
Alliance militia leaders filled senior positions in the new Afghan Interim Government, to 
include the majority of senior police posts.87  Unfortunately, many unqualified Panjshiri 
Tajiks took senior police posts simply for the prospects of patronage.88  Even though the 
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international community recognized that having too many ethnic Tajiks rewarded with 
positions would generate animosity among the majority Pashtuns, Afghanistan’s donors 
viewed this as a necessary compromise until Pashtuns could be gradually assimilated into 
the new Afghan government.89  
While Germany took proactive measures to build a highly trained, professional 
police force, Germany could not meet the massive resource requirements needed to 
satisfy Afghanistan’s internal security requirements.  With a virtually nonexistent police 
force, and a countryside riddled with insurgents and warlord militias, Afghanistan 
desperately needed to field as many legitimate police as possible.  Germany’s initial 
contributions to Afghan police development and training were invaluable.  However, 
according to the International Crisis Group, “…by 2003 it became apparent that urgently 
needed rank-and-file policing was being neglected.”90 
Germany’s slow pace and measly budget prompted the United States to initiate its 
own police-training program in 2003.91  According to a 2005 U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) report, Germany never committed to fully resourcing the 
Afghan National Police: 
Germany has viewed its role as one of advising and consulting with other 
donors and the Afghan government rather than as the major implementer 
or funding source for the police sector.92 
Although Germany remained the “lead” nation for the ANP until 2007, the United 
States became the de facto main effort for Afghan National Police training and 
resourcing.   
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E. THE UNITED STATES MAKES THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE A 
PRIORITY 
Recognizing that there was a security deficit and a desperate need for rank and 
file policemen, the U.S. Department of State, through the Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, was tasked in 2003 with establishing a basic 
training course for police soldiers.93  The U.S. contributed $26 million the first year to 
complete an Afghan National Police Central Training Center in Kabul and establish a 
large-scale police-training program.94  In order to accomplish this resource intensive task, 
the U.S. State Department contracted the private security company DynCorp 
International to construct the Central Training Center and establish a police basic training 
program for the largely uneducated police soldiers.  In 2004, the U.S. provided the 
funding for DynCorp to construct seven more Regional Training Centers in Gardez, 
Jalalabad, Kunduz, Mazar-i Sharif, Kandahar, Bamiyan, and Herat to expedite police 
training.95  
Although the resources and facilities made large-scale training of the Afghan 
National Police possible, DynCorp’s five-weeks of basic training for illiterate recruits did 
little to prevent police from embracing extortion and criminal activity.96  Additionally, 
DynCorp failed to establish the sustainment procedures needed to institutionalize the 
training or to monitor police activity after graduation.97  The U.S. rush to mass-produce 
Afghan National Police soldiers wound up costing over $860 million to train and equip 
approximately 40,000 national police between 2003 and 2005.  Unfortunately, the overall 
return on this investment was minimal and, in many cases, the new Afghan National 
Police directly undermined COIN efforts.98  Richard Holbrooke, the former U.S. 
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ambassador to the UN, put it, “The U.S. training program under DynCorp is an appalling 
joke…a complete shambles.”99  Ambassador Holbrooke’s assessment was not unique; a 
November 2006 Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board report described the Afghan 
National Police as under-funded, under-equipped, and essentially corrupt.100  
Additionally, the International Crisis Group claimed that the new U.S. policy of rapidly 
fielding large numbers of poorly trained Afghan National Police was actually making the 
security situation in Afghanistan worse.101   
Upholding the rule of law is a challenge in highly developed countries with well-
educated professional police.  Yet, somehow, the predominantly uneducated and 
minimally trained Afghan National Police have been expected to uphold the rule of law 
in a country embroiled in insurgency, ethnic infighting, poverty, and competing systems 
of law. 102  DynCorp’s five-week Basic II training program exemplifies the U.S. State 
Department’s unrealistic expectations for the Afghan National Police.  The short training 
course attempted to teach the democratic principles of policing to illiterate Afghans from 
all parts of the country.103  Some of the techniques and principles taught included: values, 
ethics, interrogation, firearms, vehicle and building searches, self-defense, arrest 
procedures, and drill and ceremony training.104  This was a tremendous amount material 
to cover in such a short period of time.  And, according to the United States Institute of 
Peace, “Few of the American instructors were professional police trainers and there was 
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little or no use of adult-learning techniques.”105  The U.S. Department of Defense and 
Department of State Inspector General’s report subsequently noted: 
The five-week Basic II Course is inadequate to prepare an ANP recruit for 
assignment to anything resembling traditional Western police duties.  
Illiterate ANP recruits can only be expected to perform supplementary or 
ancillary police duties, such as security functions, guard duty, and 
checkpoint security.106 
Considering Afghanistan’s requirement for rank and file national police, and the 
country’s high illiteracy rates, it would have been totally unrealistic to make literacy a 
standard for recruitment.107  The U.S. understood this, yet failed to tailor police training 
and development to contend with Afghanistan’s unique demographics, culture, and 
history.108  The U.S. instead adopted a Western model based on the curriculum DynCorp 
used to train the police in Kosovo.109  Applying a Western model to Afghanistan is a 
result of U.S. mirror imaging and, according to historian Kalev Sepp, training indigenous 
forces in a supporting country’s own image is a historically flawed practice in 
counterinsurgency.110 
Increasing corruption, insurgent violence, and DynCorp’s lackluster results of 
training the Afghan National Police, eventually prompted an interagency decision to shift 
responsibility for police training from the Department of State to the Department of 
Defense.  On July 12, 2005, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan 
(CSTC-A) officially assumed the lead role on behalf of the U.S. Government for training, 
equipping, and mentoring the Afghan National Police.111  The State Department 
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continued to provide support through policy guidance and oversight of civilian 
contractors responsible for police training courses.112  CSTC-A increased U.S. efforts to 
train and reform the Afghan National Police, and in just one year’s time, dedicated over 
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Figure 5.   Chronology of ANP Evolution114 
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F. THE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE AFGHAN NATIONAL 
POLICE  
The international community understood the vital role the police played in 
facilitating Afghanistan’s development and security.  However, few efforts or resources 
were initially allocated to rebuild Afghanistan’s police force.  It was not until 2005 that 
the international community took the Afghan National Police seriously and initiated 
genuine reform efforts.115  To meet the demands of increasing international support and 
resources for the Afghan National Police, the International Police Coordination Board 
was established in 2006.  The purpose of the International Police Coordination Board is 
to facilitate and coordinate the efforts of all countries contributing to the reformation of 
the Ministry of Interior and the Afghan National Police.116   
In June 2007, the European Union established the European Union Police Mission 
in Afghanistan, and replaced Germany as the “lead” for the Afghan National Police.117  
The European Union Police Mission contributes over 160 police experts from over 23 
nations to work in conjunction with CSTC-A and the Afghan National Police on police 
training and reform.118  The goal of the International Police Coordination Board is to 
“develop an effective, well organized, multi-ethnic and professional police force that 
provides the people of Afghanistan a stable rule of law”.119  While international efforts to 
resource and reform the Afghan National Police have significantly improved since 2005, 
the European Union nonetheless relies mainly on Western democratic policing methods, 
much like CSTC-A.120   
Unless the international community tailors police recruitment and training to 
Afghanistan’s unique culture and demographics, the Afghan National Police will never 
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gain the confidence of the Afghan people.  The qualifications that legitimize police in 
European countries are very different from the qualifications that legitimize police in 
Afghanistan.  
G. THE COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND: 
AFGHANISTAN INITIATES A DISTRICT APPROACH TO POLICE 
REFORM 
Given rising insecurity, the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board met in the 
spring of 2007 and agreed to increase the numbers of Afghan National Police from 
62,000 to 82,000.121  In order to meet the increased demand CSTC-A dedicated even 
more resources and personnel to building and reforming the Afghan National Police.  By 
the end of 2008, CSTC-A had over 2,500 defense personnel and approximately 550 
DynCorp civilians working to train, mentor and reform the Afghan National Police.   
In addition to increasing resources and money, CSTC-A, in conjunction with the 
Ministry of the Interior, initiated the Focused District Development (FDD) program, a 
radically new method of police reform.122  The FDD program was initiated in late 2007 
and dramatically differs from previous methods of reform, which consisted primarily of 
providing additional training and equipping.  The new program assesses, trains, 
reconstitutes, and mentors a district’s entire police force at one time.123  An entire 
district’s police force is withdrawn to one of the Afghan National Police Regional 
Training Centers, and is temporarily replaced by an Afghan National Civil Order Police 
unit.124  At the Regional Training Centers, the district police force undergoes an eight-
week long training program that simultaneously addresses local governance, public 
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works, and elements of the rule of law.125  The newly retrained Afghan National Police 
unit then returns to its district accompanied by a coalition police mentor team.  The police 
mentor team remains at the district with the police unit until it receives a Capability 
Milestone rating of 1 (CM1), which signifies that the unit is fully capable of 
accomplishing its mission without external support.126  The estimated time for a full FDD 
training cycle is 10 to 13 months.  (See Figure 6.)  
 
Figure 6.   Typical FDD Timeline127 
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According to the International Crisis Group, “The Focused District Development 
program has the potential to contribute to a better trained and equipped police service, 
and is focused at the level that has the most impact on daily life.”128  Evidence of FDD 
success can be seen in some noteworthy accomplishments over the last two years.  Since 
May of 2009, 12 district units participating in the FDD program have achieved a CM1 
rating.  (See Figure 7.) 
 
 
Figure 7.   The CM Ratings of the 52 ANP District Units Engaged in FDD (As of May 
2009)129 
Although the FDD is moving the Afghan National Police in the right direction, it 
has taken almost two years of intense training and mentoring to get just 12 of the 52 
Afghan National Police units participating in the program to a level where they can  
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operate independently.  The real test for the success of the FDD program will come when 
the mentor teams depart the CM1-rated districts and the Afghan National Police are left 
to their own devices.   
Another challenge CSTC-A faces is the sheer number of Afghan National Police 
district units.  Although 52 units have participated thus far, there are a total of 365 
Afghan National Police district units operating in Afghanistan, which means that the 
remaining 313 Afghan National Police units are not participating in the FDD program.130  
It must also be noted that there are 397 districts in Afghanistan; therefore, some district 
police units are responsible for policing more than one district.131  If fully trained and 
rated Afghan National Police district units revert to their previous activities of extortion 
and bribery after the mentor teams depart, the program will never achieve success.  It will 
be like stamping out a fire, but leaving behind smoldering coals.   
All told, the U.S. has invested over $6.7 billion and seven years of training in the 
Afghan National Police, yet the Afghan National Police are still ill equipped, largely 
ineffective and, for the most part, corrupt.132  The FDD program is conceptually sound, 
because it addresses Afghan National Police issues at the local level.  However, the FDD 
program is manpower-intensive and fails to fully incorporate the communities.  
According to a 2008 report to Congress, the FDD program is challenged by shortages of 
coalition Police Mentor Teams, Afghan National Civil Order Police, available space at 
the Regional Training Centers, and lack of support from provincial governors.133   
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Even though an increase in resources and training facilities will improve the FDD 
program, this does not address or resolve the core issue of legitimacy.  With all its merits, 
the FDD program is treating the symptoms (training, equipment, pay, ethics) and not the 
root causes of Afghan National Police illegitimacy, (trust, kinship, customary law, Islam).  
The heart of the FDD program is to professionalize the district Afghan National Police 
unit, but the program is mistakenly based on a Western precept that quality training and 
education stymies corruption and patronage.  Of course, if this precept were true, we 
would not see such high levels of corruption and patronage among Afghanistan’s most 
educated elites currently governing the country.134  
Instead, in order to prevent Afghan National Police district units from returning to 
their old ways of bribery, extortion, and patronage, a system of checks and balances 
needs to be introduced that holds the Afghan National Police accountable to both the 
community and the central government.  Even though the district’s police are removed, 
retrained, and monitored by mentors, if they are not legitimate in the eyes of the district’s 
community before the retraining, they will remain illegitimate afterwards.  The only 
difference is they will now be better trained.  
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V. AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE COMPOSITION  
The true and patriotic police officer is the friend of the people.  People 
always approach them to get rid of oppression.  If police officers do not 
have these qualities people would rather prefer to live under oppression 
and injustice rather than going to the police since they know that applying 
to the police will bring additional problems. 
—President Karzai, speaking on Radio Afghanistan, 21 November 2002135 
Six separate services make up the Afghan National Police.  Each service has a 
different and distinct mission that spans an extensive array of law enforcement and 
security functions.  While all six services will be described, this thesis focuses on the 
Afghan Uniformed Police.  The Afghan Uniformed Police are by far the largest service, 
with a reported strength of 44,319.136  The Afghan Uniformed Police, also known as the 
Afghan National Police, serve at every level of government and are responsible for 
Afghanistan’s day-to-day police activities.  The Afghan Uniformed Police are responsible 
for maintaining security and public order, preventing crime, regulating traffic, and 
protecting public and private property.137  Below is an excerpt from the CSTC-A’s Web 
page that describes the size and function of Afghanistan’s various police organizations: 
The Uniformed Police are the single largest police element with more 
than 40,000 positions. They are responsible for general law enforcement, 
public safety and internal security throughout the provinces and districts of 
Afghanistan. 
The Afghan Border Police, with an authorized strength of 17,000, are 
responsible for patrolling Afghanistan’s borders, conducting counter-
smuggling operations, and managing immigration. 
The Civil Order Police are responsible for responding to civil 
disturbances in large urban areas and patrolling in high threat areas. The 
Civil Order Police has nearly 5,000 police positions. 
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The Counter Narcotics Police are responsible for the elimination of 
production and the trafficking of illicit drugs.  
The Criminal Investigation Division Police investigate a wide range of 
criminal offenses.  
The Counter Terrorism Police are responsible for conducting counter-
insurgency operations.138 
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VI. CURRENT STATUS OF REFORM AND THE AFGHAN 
NATIONAL POLICE 
…villagers say the government’s police force was so brutal and corrupt 
that they welcomed the Taliban as liberators.  The police would stop 
people driving on motorcycles, beat them and take their money. 
Mohammad Gul pointed to two compounds of neighbors where pre-teen 
children had been abducted by police to be used for the local practice of 
“bachabazi,” or sex with pre-pubescent boys.  “If the boys were out in the 
fields, the police would come and rape them,” he said. “You can go to any 
police base and you will see these boys. They hold them until they are 
finished with them and then let the child go.  
—An interview with Mohammad Gul, an elder in the village of Pankela, 
Helmand Province, July 2009139 
Combining the blood, treasure, and time spent, with the overwhelmingly bleak 
assessments about the Afghan National Police, one could conclude that police reform has 
failed.  And, because the current methods of reform are not effectively preventing 
corruption and patronage, or fostering support from the local community, new systems 
need to be established.  Police reform must go beyond broad-brush training and should be 
tailored to meet the specific requirements of Afghanistan’s distinct local communities.   
There are countless explanations for why the Afghan National Police continue to 
fail: history, warlords, militias, organized crime, narcotics, ethnic rivalries, corruption, a 
lack of funding, training, and mentoring just to list a few.140  Yet, while many experts 
recognize the Afghan National Police’s deficiencies, relatively few provide 
recommendations for reform based on Afghanistan’s unique culture and history.  Instead, 
most Western counterinsurgency experts and analysts, to include Anthony Cordesman, 
Seth Jones, John Nagl, Michael O’Hanlon, and David Kilcullen, propose improving or 
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slightly altering the existing mechanisms for reform.141  These mechanisms 
predominantly consist of: new and/or better training, more mentoring and education, and 
a significant increase in resources.  They support their arguments by looking to the past 
and present success of the ANA and Western police forces.  The problem with this, 
however, is they do not take into account the multitude of complicating factors that stem 
from Afghanistan’s unique and very non-Western society.  
There is no doubt that the ANA has been more successful than the Afghan 
National Police at both gaining the support of the people and battling the Taliban.  
However, using the Afghan Army as a model for the Afghan National Police is as 
misguided as modeling the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigations or the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration after the U.S. Army.  Additionally, analysts and policy 
makers use the ANA’s success to make the case that increased resources equal increased 
success.  While it is true that the Afghan Army has received almost double the training 
and resources of the Afghan National Police, however, increasing training and resources 
will not have the same effects on the Afghan National Police as they have had on the 
ANA.  This is so for a variety of reasons, which require us to examine the very different 
roles, history, and composition of the two organizations.142   
First, the ANA was built from scratch in 2002, limiting the effect preexisting 
rivalries and bad habits, might have had on soldiers.  In contrast, the Afghan National 
Police was filled with entire cohorts drawn from warlord militias.143  Second, the Army’s 
role as a national military force prevents constant interaction with the population, as 
opposed to the Afghan National Police who are embedded and always present.  Third, the 
Army is comprised of large multi-ethnic units that rarely operate in elements smaller than 
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120-man companies.  The Army’s ethnic diversity and large size lend themselves to a 
system of checks and balances, and the sheer size of a company helps prevent the ANA 
from being effectively coerced by the Taliban or a local warlord.  Additionally, the 
companies’ multi-ethnic makeup restrains ANA soldiers from extorting members of rival 
tribes or ethnic groups.  In contrast, the Afghan National Police operate in units with 
usually fewer than 12 men, and can easily be coerced by resident warlords or the 
Taliban.144  Also, without the support of the local community, no amount or quality of 
training will prevent the Afghan National Police from capitulating when the only likely 
option is death.   
Meanwhile, the rationale for training the ANA in Western-style policing, based 
on the premise that Western police forces are successful, is equally flawed.  Afghanistan 
is not like a Western country, not when 72% of Afghans are illiterate, the country is 
stricken with poverty, plagued with corruption, rife with ethnic infighting and mistrust, 
and battling a growing insurgency that threatens the very existence of the government.145  
Creating a Western-style police force in Afghanistan is unrealistic under the current 
cultural and socioeconomic conditions.146  Yet, the U.S. and the international community 
remain fixated on applying Western techniques and procedures.147  As this thesis 
contends, this is a mistake. (See Appendix A: Afghanistan Police Training Mission Basic 
Police Course Overview)   
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VII. THE IMPORTANCE OF HISTORY AND CULTURE IN THE 
AFGHAN POLICE 
Kinship is the most significant social organizational principle at the local 
level throughout the country.  Kin-based groupings at the local level have 
helped maintain the most durable and resilient communities of trust in 
rural villages, nomadic camps, and urban neighborhoods.  These 
communities of trust operate in the form of informal local shuras, 
resolving disputes and mobilizing to defend and protect themselves in 
times of crisis.  They are the most precious resource Afghanistan 
possesses for building a stable and sustainable state.148 
Although years of conflict have left Afghanistan a shattered mosaic devoid of 
absolutes, certain cultural norms, especially among rural Afghan communities, have 
flourished.  These unwritten social attributes can be found throughout rural Afghanistan, 
and have proved vital to the survival of aqawam or solidarity groups in times of hardship 
and conflict.  Over the past decades, they have actually bound groups even more tightly 
together.149   
Culture is defined many different ways, but for the purposes of this thesis I will 
use Richard Shweder’s definition: “community-specific ideas about what is true, good, 
beautiful, and efficient.  To be ‘cultural,’ those ideas…must be socially inherited and 
customary.”150  Because Afghan cultural norms are relevant to good governance and 
COIN, efforts should be taken to better understand preexisting cultural nuances.  Only by 
developing an appreciation for culture at the local level is it possible to tailor political, 
military, and civil commitments to a local environment.151  
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If we apply this concept to the Afghan National Police, their recruitment, vetting, 
and employment should be tailored to meet local cultural needs.  This is especially 
important in such a relationship-based setting as Afghanistan, where the needs of the 
family or clan take priority over the needs of individuals.  In collective societies, the 
positive actions of an individual benefit the entire solidarity group, while any shame 
tarnishes the stature of the entire group.152  The collective bonds of Afghan solidarity 
groups are so strong at the family and clan level that any attack or slight against an 
individual is invariably met with a collective response.153  Cultural codes that mandate 
collective action are common throughout rural Afghanistan and should be exploited to 
facilitate police accountability.  These customary laws are based on unwritten ethical and 
cultural norms, and the rules they establish are far more binding than the Afghan 
government’s state legal codes.154  
Customary law has historically been an integral part of rural Afghan society 
where communities use it to resolve disputes and muster community militias to protect 
the community or enforce the law.  Consequently, Afghan National Police that are drawn 
from rural communities would be bound by customary law to serve the community.  If an 
Afghan National Police soldier extorted a family or clan member from his community 
this would bring shame not only upon him, but his entire family.  The family would not 
tolerate the policeman’s behavior, and would likely punish him through shame or 
ostracism.  Additionally, the community would be obligated to support and protect 
Afghan National Police who are members of the community, because again an attack on 
an individual who is a member of the clan requires a collective retaliatory response.155   
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The argument here is: when the community sanctions Afghan National Police, 
they are beholden to the community they serve.  And because Afghan National Police 
corruption and ineffectiveness are rooted in a lack of accountability, empowering 
communities to select their own police would improve Afghan National Police 
effectiveness and reduce corruption.   
The current government system typically deploys national police who have no ties 
to the community.156  Lacking direct ties to the community, the police are then often 
viewed with suspicion and treated as outsiders.  Additionally, the central government 
attempts to use the Afghan National Police to enforce law and exert control from Kabul, a 
policy that has routinely failed.  The central government of Afghanistan attempted to 
exercise its authority beyond the urban centers twice in the last century, resulting in rural 
revolts that overthrew the central government both times.157  Rural Afghans have had a 
long history of preferring self-governance and autonomy to state rule, which is a direct 
consequence of rural Afghans favoring their particular customary laws.158   
Customary laws and relationships are based on trust and support.  Trust and 
support are automatic among rural Afghan family members.  But for anyone who is not 
family (direct or extended), trust and support can only be earned or lost over time.159  
Thus, trust and support have to be considered essential to establishing legitimate Afghan 
police forces in rural Afghanistan.   
Over the past 30 years, the Afghan people have been engulfed in internal and 
external conflict.  Families have been forced to choose sides as local and foreign power 
brokers vie for control of territory and people.  Their trust and confidence in government 
and external forces are shallow at best.  To compensate for the lack of trust, Afghans  
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have had little choice but to rely on their ethnic groups for security and accountability.160  
Locally recruited police represent the most reasonable means for restoring faith in an 
external centrally based authority.   
Francis Fukuyama defines social capital as, “an instantiated set of informal values 
or norms shared among members of a group that permits them to cooperate with one 
another.”161  The foundation for social capital in Afghanistan is the clan.  Understanding 
the importance of this social capital is critical to determining how to efficiently employ 
Afghan police forces.  Louis Dupree spent years living among Afghan tribesmen, 
documenting some of the tribal codes that govern social relationships and ways of life for 
rural Afghans.  According to Dupree: 
The formalized segmentary lineages in rural Afghanistan and Pakistan 
(strongest along the Durand Line of 1893) have developed a sensitive 
network of interlocking, reciprocal rights and obligations, not only 
between the kin-units, but between patrons and clients.162 
Knowledge about local history, inter-personal relationships, and reputations 
inform rural Afghans’ views about reciprocal rights.  Afghan police who have no ties to 
the people they support do not know this history.  Although they may be able to develop 
relations over time, without accountability the police often yield to the temptation of easy 
money through extortion.163  
If locals do not trust, or are not willing to cooperate with, the Afghan police 
because of corruption, conflict, or ethnic rivalries, just throwing more non-local national 
police at the problem will likely make the situation worse.  The International Crisis 
Group (2007) acknowledged this dilemma in a recent study: 
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…the main motivation behind this enhanced attention [increasing the 
numbers of ANP] is a pressing need to quash the insurgency, the approach 
taken is largely shortsighted, with much of the emphasis on quantity over 
quality.  This is the wrong way to build a legitimate, accountable 
institution.   Ineffective and corrupt policing not only fails to prevent 
conflict but can actually exacerbate it…164 
In addition to using culture and customary laws to make Afghan police more 
legitimate, a basic appreciation for the different Afghan ethnic groups and religions can 
only improve police effectiveness.  
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VIII. ISLAM, ETHNICITY, AND AFGHAN SOLIDARITY GROUPS  
In Afghanistan the identity of each individual is defined by a series of 
affiliations, from the most general – to the umma (the Muslim community 
as a whole) – to the narrowest, the close family.  A sense of identity may 
be based on a shared geographical origin, or on a common affiliation – 
professional, religious, family, ethnic etc.165 
While ethnic and religious diversity is a noble goal for the Afghan National 
Police, diversity can have a diminishing effect on security in some situations.  An 
analogy between the U.S. and Afghanistan is perhaps the best method for demonstrating 
the critical roles religion and ethnicity play in security and policing.  There are currently 
Dari-speaking Shia Hazara Afghan National Police soldiers attempting to enforce justice 
and provide security in the rural Pashtun districts of Kandahar Province.166  To many 
westerners or even progressive urban Afghans, this may seem like a good way to prevent 
patronage or limit tribal power.  However, to a rural Pashtun, a Shia Hazara has about as 
much of a chance of being accepted and trusted by the community as a Catholic African-
American FBI Agent sent in to police a rural all white Mississippi town in the 1950s.  
The major difference between these two scenarios is that the African-American would at 
least be able to speak the language.  
Afghanistan’s eclectic mix of ethnic groups, languages, and lifestyles makes it in 
many ways more of a melting pot than the United States of America.  Afghanistan has 
five major ethnic groups and dozens of minor ethnic groups, almost each of which speaks 
its own language.167  While the official languages of Afghanistan are Dari and Pashto, 
there are an additional 35 spoken languages.168  The most unifying characteristics 
available to Afghan nationalists are, arguably, Islam and nationalism.169  Ironically, over 
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the past 20 years religion and nationalism have kept the Afghan people in conflict 
regarding who should rule, and the role that Islam should be accorded in government.  
Islam permeates Afghanistan historically, culturally, and politically—99% of 
Afghans subscribe to Islam.  Consequently, being a Muslim is taken for granted; 
however, being perceived to be a pious Muslim is the fountainhead of legitimacy for all 
Afghan leaders, government officials, and holders of authority.170  Although most 
Afghans are Muslim, Islam in Afghanistan is not homogeneous.  There are two 
fundamentally different sects of Islam in Afghanistan, the largest and most prominent one 
being Sunni Islam.  Approximately 80% of Afghans are Sunnis, and Sunni Islam has 
dominated Afghan politics for the last three centuries.  The remaining 19% of the 
population practice Shia Islam. 171  Historically, Shia Afghans have been violently 
persecuted and politically and economically discriminated against by their Sunni 
countrymen.  
While there is no single ethnic group that represents more than 50% of the 
population, the Pashtuns come closest with an estimated 42%.  The Tajiks are the second 
largest ethnic group and make up about 26% population, followed by the Hazaras at 18%, 
the Uzbeks at 6.3%, the Turkmen at 2.5%, the Qizilbash at 1%, and a sum total of the 
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Figure 8.   Graphic Depiction of Afghanistan’s Major Ethnic Groups173 
The Pashtuns are the largest and most powerful ethnic group in Afghanistan, 
controlling national politics for over 250 years.  In Afghanistan, the Pashtuns are divided 
into two major tribal confederations: the Ghilzais who are concentrated in the 
mountainous region that separates Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the Durrranis who 
inhabit the southern and western portions of Afghanistan.174  (See Figure 8.)  The other 
major Pashtun tribes include the Wardak, Jaji, Tani, Jadran, Mangal, Khugiani, Safi, 
Mohmand and Shinwari.175  (See Figure 9.)   
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While it is convenient to identify and stereotype Afghan Pashtuns as either 
members of the Ghilzai Tribe, or members of the Durrani Tribe, the fractionalization and 
competition among the Pashtun clans goes far beyond the two confederations.  Historic 
rivalries are not limited to the Ghilzai and Durrani, but also occur between numerous sub-
tribes and clans within the Ghilzai and Durrani confederations.176  Another important 
facet concerning the Pashtun tribes is that the majority of them are neither communal nor 
political, but do use kinship to form alliances against a common enemy or threat.177  This 
is important for differentiating between tribes and communities.  Communities from 
different villages but from the same tribe frequently have long-standing rivalries and 
would be unlikely to coalesce unless there was a significant external threat.  Thomas 
Barfield cites the famous line, “Me against my brother; my brothers and me against my 
cousins; my brothers, cousins, and me against the world,” as an example of how Pashtuns 
use their tribal order to compete or coalesce.178 
Additionally, Pashtuns are predominantly egalitarian and acephalous, and believe 
that they are all born equal.179  No Pashtun (other than a father telling his son) can tell 
another Pashtun what to do.  This is because most Pashtuns are traditionally beholden to 
the moral code of Pashtunwali (the way of the Pashtun), which is based on seyal 
(equality).180  While local khans or big men have significant influence, they cannot order 
members of the tribe or clan to do anything.  Decisions that affect the tribe or clan are not 
made by individuals, but are made collectively through a shura or jirga, and once a 
decision is agreed upon all members must adhere to it or risk ostracism or banishment 
from the community.181 
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Pashtunwali governs social behavior for most Pashtuns and even many non-
Pashtuns living in rural communities throughout Afghanistan.  Pashtunwali also 
establishes strict rules that are enforced by the community.  This unwritten moral code is 
an inherited way of life that is sacred and based on honor, personal autonomy, 
competition, and the protection of women, wealth, and land.182  The intricacies of 
Pashtun culture, history, and clan dynamics are just a few reasons why it is so important 
to have an intimate knowledge of local Pashtun politics before attempting to establish 
mechanisms for enforcing local security, let alone introducing police. 
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Figure 9.   The Pashtun Tribes and Their Major Clans.183 
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The Tajiks, who make up about 26% of the total population, are non-tribal and 
form their solidarity groups based on family origins.184  Tajiks often refer to themselves 
by the name of the valley or region they inhabit, such as Panjsheri, Kabuli, Andarabi, 
Samangani, Herati, Badakhshi, etc.  Afghan Tajiks are predominantly Dari-speaking Suni 
Muslims, and mainly live in the northern provinces of Afghanistan.185    
The Hazaras, 18% of the population overall, comprise the largest Shia ethnic 
group.  They mainly live in Afghanistan’s central mountainous core, referred to as 
Hazarajat (Land of the Hazara).186 (See Figure 8.)  The Hazaras have Asian features and 
are believed to be the descendants of the Turkic and Mongol hordes.187  While most 
Hazara can speak Dari, their native language is Hazaragi, a Persian-based language with 
a mixture of Mongol words.188  Because of the Hazaras’ unique physical appearance and 
Shia religious preference, both the Pashtuns and Tajiks have traditionally mistreated 
them, marginalizing them both politically and economically.189 
At just over 6% of the population, Uzbeks live across the northern plains of 
Afghanistan, and are often collocated within Tajik villages.190  The Uzbeks speak their 
own language known as Uzbeki, and are almost exclusively Sunni.  Uzbeks, unlike 
Pashtuns, are patriarchal, affording their leaders (begs, arbabs or khans) considerable 
authoritarian power.191 
When it comes to security, ethnic and religious diversity can be a double-edged 
sword.  In large cities where clan and ethnic rivalries have atrophied, an ethnically 
diverse police force can reduce patronage and prevent an imbalance of power between 
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ethnic groups.  However, in rural Afghanistan, where customary law and kinship take 
precedence, and local rivalries are inescapable, a diverse police force can actually 




IX. UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN RURAL 
AND URBAN AFGHANS  
To city people those in the hinterlands are more barbarian than civilized.  
Who (except perhaps an anthropologist like myself) would live with such 
people voluntarily?  As a foreigner, I was often more comfortable dealing 
with nomads and villagers than some of my urban Afghan acquaintances.  
I at least respected their culture, which most city people (particularly 
educated ones) either held in contempt or feared.  Of course people in the 
hinterland viewed city dwellers as weak willed and corrupt.  And people in 
the countryside had little good to say of the political elites in the capital, 
regardless or their ethnic origin.” 
—Thomas J. Barfield192 
It is imperative for U.S. and coalition officials supporting the Afghan government 
at any level to understand the deep and historic fissures between urban and rural Afghans.  
Unfortunately, many Afghan analysts and almost all pundits point to ethnic and tribal 
rivalries, but ignore the very real enmity between rural and urban Afghans.  While ethnic 
and tribal differences may remain too visible to be ignored, rural and cosmopolitan 
Afghans have bitterly opposed philosophies about education, governance, religion, social 
behavior, and law.  These have pitted members of both classes against each other over the 
years.  And because it is almost exclusively the urban class that makes up the small 
minority of elites who govern the rural masses and collaborate with U.S. and coalition 
officials, understanding this culture divide may help prevent decisions or policies being 
made based solely on class agendas or biases. 
Historically, Afghanistan has been ruled by urban elites who would go to great 
efforts to coerce, subjugate, and even homogenize the diverse populations of 
Afghanistan.193  However, rural Afghans have just as adamantly rejected and resisted the 
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central government’s attempts to control or reform Afghanistan’s periphery.194  
Successful rulers who achieved a modicum of peace and prosperity during their reign did 
so by striking a balance between central government rule and tribal or qowm sovereignty.  
In contrast, the rulers who attempted to reform the highly conservative rural societies of 
Afghanistan were met with violent resistance and were ultimately overthrown.195   
Both King Amanullah in 1929 and Nur Muhammad Taraki in 1979 attempted to 
expand the role of the central government by introducing and enforcing liberal 
progressive reforms, which were vehemently rejected and ultimately led to violent 
uprisings.  Conservative rural Afghans inspired by the ulema (Islamic scholars or 
teachers) rose up and overthrew King Amanullah for his Western attitudes towards things 
like constitutionalism, the role of religion in the state, and the rights of women.196  Like 
King Amanullah, Taraki and the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) also 
set out to reform Afghanistan.  In June of 1979, the PDPA announced its initial thirty-
point program of economic and social reform.  This ignited popular uprisings all over 
Afghanistan.197  The uprisings were so bad that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to 
protect its own interests, resulting in over a decade of war between the communists and 
the mujahidin parties.198 
The central government has typically controlled the urban areas and wealthy 
agrarian plains of Afghanistan, though these areas are few and far between.199  In 
Afghanistan, fewer than ten cities exceed a population of 100,000, and most are located 
along the main highway.  The largest urban areas include Kabul, Kandahar, Heart, 
Mazar-i-Sharif, and Kunduz.  The central government has been able to control the cities 
largely because urban Afghans have grown accustomed and even dependent on  
                                                 
194  Tribal Analysis Center, Simultaneously Clearing, Holding, and Building: A Rural Development 
Team Program, Williamsburg, VA: (2009). 
195  Marsden and Minority Rights Group, Afghanistan: Minorities, Conflict and the Search for Peace, 
15. 
196  Dorronsoro, Revolution Unending: Afghanistan, 1979 to the Present, 35. 
197  Ibid., 87. 
198  Marsden and Minority Rights Group, Afghanistan: Minorities, Conflict and the Search for Peace, 
6. 
199  Barfield, Culture and Custom in Nation-Building: Law in Afghanistan, 354. 
 65
government administration for services and law.  Additionally, urban Afghans tend to 
lose their kinship ties and adherence to customary law, which tends to fuel rural Afghan 
resistance to government or outsiders.200  
Consequently, policing in rural Afghanistan, where the Taliban flourish, is far 
more challenging than in urban areas.  First, rural communities view the central 
government with suspicion, and only trust family or known members of the 
community.201  Second, the terrain is vast and rugged, and the people are diverse and 
fractionalized.202  A simple analysis of the human and physical terrain demonstrates the 
complexity and magnitude of what is required to police rural Afghanistan.   
It must be noted that Afghanistan is about the size of Texas, and is divided into 34 
provinces and 397 districts.203  While 397 districts may seem like a manageable number, 
there are over 38,000 villages spread across these districts.204  That is an average of 96 
villages per district and, to complicate things further, in many cases, villages are not 
always ethnically or tribally homogeneous.  Finally, mountain ranges and other natural 
barriers isolate numerous villages within the same district, making communication and 
transportation slow and tedious. 
A diverse national police force may be effective in urban areas where Afghans are 
accustomed to government administration and no longer adhere to customary laws.  
However, in rural Afghanistan where kinship and traditional moral codes like 
Pashtunwali are viewed as sacred, it is unlikely that a national police force will be 
accepted or effective.  Even in the U.S., where communities elect sheriffs and local 
officials manage city police, the idea of using a national police force to enforce local law 
or uphold justice is a foreign concept.  In the U.S., the vast majority of law enforcement 
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officials have always been local police.  According to the Department of Justice, there are 
over 731,903 local and state law enforcement officials in the U.S. and only 104,884 
federal law enforcement officials.205  In other words, as well developed and urbanized as 
the U.S. is, with a strong federal government, it still maintains a seven-to-one ratio of 
local to national police.  Afghanistan, on the other hand, is underdeveloped, rural, and has 
a weak central government, yet refuses to cede any control through local law 
enforcement. 
This is not an argument against the national police.  Urban Afghans, like many 
urban Americans, are indifferent to who the police officer is, as long as mechanisms for 
settling grievances are in place.  However, many rural Americans, like rural Afghans, are 
only accepting of local police who have longstanding ties with the community.  Finally, 
because most rural Afghans distrust both government officials and outsiders, it is 
sagacious for the Afghan government to recruit and employ the majority of rural police 
from within their own communities.  
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X. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TRIBAL POLICE, WARLORD 
MILITIAS, AND LOCAL MILITIAS  
The concept of a community police force is not the same as arbaki, or a 
local militia force created by the government.  Members of both 
community police and defense forces should be selected by their elders on 
the basis of consensus.  They should be trained and equipped by the 
government, registered, and subjected to the rules and regulations drawn 
up collaboratively by the government and the local communities.206 
All too often the terms ‘local militia’, arbaki, and lashkar, are used 
synonymously.  Yet the organizations they describe are very different both in structure 
and function.207  This misuse of the vernacular has created confusion among policy 
makers and military officials, and hinders progress in security reform. 
The most confused term is militia, which is often associated with the pre Taliban 
warlords.208  While warlord militias evoke thoughts of brutal repression, human rights 
violations, and feudalism, they are not always tribal, and have never been governed by a 
collective shura or jirga.209  A single strong man or muhahideen commander attracted a 
set of followers, usually by being a charismatic or heroic individual who rose to power 
during the war with the Soviets.  Many of these commanders were not tribal notables or 
mullahs, but gained notoriety through success in battle and access to money and 
weapons.210  When the war with the Soviets ended and the money dried up, they then 
used their private armies to create warlord fiefdoms that taxed the people and seized land 
and possessions at will.211  
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If warlords gave militias a bad name, so did the ill-conceived Afghan Nation 
Auxiliary Police program.212  The Afghan National Auxiliary Police lasted only two 
years, and was widely considered a failure.213  Although the program was touted as a 
form of local policing, it involved no community consensus.  Governors and police chiefs 
were able to indiscriminately hire Afghan National Auxiliary Police, which only 
strengthened their position over rival solidarity groups.214  In essence, the Afghan 
National Auxiliary Police sanctioned a type of militia run by corrupt government 
officials.    
The most significant difference between arbakis or lashkars and the se two 
varieties of militia, warlord and Afghan National Auxiliary Police, is that arbakis and 
lashkars are the product of consensus and are not the personal armies of individual 
commanders. 
The Tribal Analysis Center defines arbakis and lashkars as the following: 
Arbakai are generally identified as the tribal police force.  The institution 
is seen more commonly in Afghanistan’s Paktia Province and these 
appointed men supervise the implementation of the tribal jirga’s decisions.  
The normal punishment for serious disobedience involves burning the 
house of the guilty party. 
A lashkar is a body of tribesmen of a particular qawm that normally 
gathers in response to a particular… problem.  The use of the term is 
flexible when size is concerned and can be applied to a dozen men going 
to attack a nearby village as a result of a family feud and it is also used for 
the fifty thousand-man force that supported the Pakistani military in the 
war in Kashmir in 1947–48.215 
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Additionally, arbakis and lashkars are local and are formed for a specific purpose 
based on a jirga or shura decision.  They are not paid, and once their specific task is 
accomplished, the men return to their previous profession.  Anthropologist David 
Edwards provides a good description of a traditional lashkar in Heroes of the Age: 
In the tribal army, of lashkar, each lineage and group fought under its own 
flag and maintained its autonomy of action.  Tribal warriors were loath to 
accept the authority of any leader, whether it was from within or outside 
their own group, and this meant that decisions had to be made by 
consensus.216 
Historically, community militias or tribal police have been most effective when 
mustered to support the police or army within their own community.  Past Afghan 
monarchs relied on arbakis and lashkars to fight alongside the army in defense of the 
country.217  This was evident in all three Anglo-Afghan wars, where various arbakis and 
lashkars threw their support behind the Afghan government and successfully repelled 
Britain’s forces.   
Now, imagine if the majority of Afghan National Police were sanctioned by a 
local shura or jirga.  The militias would be obligated by customary law to protect and 
support them.  Local and/or tribal militias have great potential in Afghanistan.  However, 
for the militias to be effective, the Afghan government and its coalition partners must be 
judicious and understand how to anchor them responsibly in the local community.  
Finally, which local militias deserve support should depend on their relations both with 
the local community and with the Afghan government.218 
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XI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Obama administration has acknowledged the importance of the police 
and announced its intentions to expand and improve the ANP as a key part 
of its plan for stabilizing Afghanistan.219 
 
The recommendations presented in this thesis draw from my experiences in 
Afghanistan and academic research at the Naval Postgraduate School.  These 
recommendations are meant to improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Afghan 
National Police, one of President Obama’s top priorities in The Way Forward in 
Afghanistan.220 
First, as suggested in the introduction, ISAF and the GIRoA need to make the 
police their number one priority for resources and manpower because a legitimate and 
effective police force is better suited than the military to defeat insurgencies. 221  
Currently the ANA receives more attention and resources than the Afghan National 
Police.  While the army has an important role to play in Afghanistan’s clear, hold, and 
build strategy, it is only organized to clear areas and is not designed to permanently hold 
ground.  Police forces, on the other hand, are organized and designed to permanently hold 
ground, protect the population, and provide the security required to improve governance 
and services.222  The first step toward improving their effectiveness is to reallocate some 
of the assets currently dedicated to the ANA to increase training, improve support, and 
restructure portions of the Afghan National Police.  While more assets will improve the 
capability and capacity of the police, how those assets are utilized is even more  
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important.  Efforts need to be made to reorganize the Afghan National Police to best meet 
the needs of rural Afghans while simultaneously improving the security situation in 
Afghanistan.     
The second recommendation is to fundamentally restructure the Afghan National 
Police in accordance with traditional and cultural precepts.  Most rural Afghans do not 
trust the Afghan National Police or consider them legitimate.  In rural areas where 
kinship and customary law are more important than the government, all the training in the 
world will not make the police legitimate in the eyes of the local communities. 
A. THE MAJORITY OF RURAL AFGHAN POLICE MUST BE LOCAL  
Communities need to select and sanction police through local shuras or jirgas.  A 
collective decision made by the community is binding, confers instant legitimacy, and 
guarantees mutual support of the community for the police and vice versa.223  
Additionally, both parties will hold each other accountable according to customary law 
and kinship.  Patronage and extortion would be out of the question because the individual 
would not risk shaming his entire family who are members of the community.   
Many will argue that if local communities select their own police, the police will 
be more loyal to the community than to the central government.  This is a valid argument, 
but even in the U.S. a local sheriff adheres to federal laws, yet is loyal to the community 
he or she serves.  The two are not antithetical.  Besides, in many cases, there is no tension 
with the central government; instead, friction arises over control and patronage by the 
provincial and district governors.  This is one reason why many districts and provincial 
governors have resisted the FDD program. 224  ISAF and the GIRoA need to closely 
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examine what is more important, a police force that executes the will of the central 
government at the expense of the community, or a community-based police force that 
may not be totally loyal to distant politicians, but is capable of administering justice and 
denying the Taliban sanctuary. 
Establishing a local police force in rural Afghanistan would not require 
disbanding the Afghan National Police, or even creating a new police organization.  What 
it would instead require is reorganizing the existing force.  Afghanistan’s Ministry of 
Interior and CSTC-A maintain personnel records on all Afghan National Police.  This 
database can be used to put Afghan National Police soldiers back into their own 
communities after a shura or jirga decision to accept the soldier.  If the community is not 
willing to sanction the individual, he or she should probably not be an Afghan National 
Police soldier in the first place.  In the rare instances when the community does not want 
the Afghan National Police soldier, that soldier should either be transferred to the army, 
or released from service.  In the event that there are not enough local Afghan National 
Police to provide security in a particular area, more police should be recruited through the 
local shura or jirga, and then put through the Afghan National Police training program. 
B. ESTABLISHING A SYSTEM OF CHECKS AND BALANCES 
A system of checks and balances can limit patronage and reduce corruption.  
While every situation will vary according to the local environment, there should be at 
least three local police soldiers to every one that is brought in from outside the 
community.  Additionally, the district police chief should be nominated by the district 
shura or jirga and then approved by the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Interior 
should have the authority to fire the district police chief in the event that he or she 
performs unsatisfactorily.  The provincial and regional police chiefs should remain 
government appointees to provide oversight for the local districts.  Finally, police 
salaries, along with equipment, and government projects could be used to incentivize 
good performance or penalize poor performance.   
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C. REFORM THE RECRUITING PROCESS 
Currently, district police chiefs and district governors can recruit their own 
Afghan National Police soldiers, as long as the individuals are not drug users, or have a 
criminal record.  The initial vetting process requires two tribal elders to verify the 
character of the individual.225 (See Appendix B: Afghan National Police Vetting and 
Recruiting Presentation)  Because any two elders can vouch for an Afghan National 
Police recruit, district police chiefs and governors have the freedom to build their own 
Afghan National Police units.  Unfortunately, these units often execute the biding of the 
governor or police chief and frequently do not have the interest of the community in 
mind.  At a minimum, police recruits should be sanctioned by a district shura or jirga to 
prevent patronage or clan rivalries.  
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF ISLAM 
Islam is the ultimate source of legitimacy for all Afghan leaders, government 
officials, and holders of authority.226  Because good Muslims and religious scholars are 
afforded special privileges, respect, and authorities, it should be a goal of the Afghan 
government to religiously educate select members of the Afghan National Police.  
Government run religious schools for the Afghan National Police could have two positive 
effects.  First, receiving religious schooling should elevate the legitimacy of the police 
soldiers.  Second, it can reduce the effects and legitimacy of the Taliban.  Mullah Omar 
recognizes the importance of Islam and Pashtunwali and used them both to discredit 
Afghan police in a press release:  
If the police of a state consist of people who are immoral and irreligious, 
who are drug addicts and whom their families turn away, how can they 
protect the property, dignity and honor of the people?227  
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The Taliban use Islam as a weapon to drive a wedge between the people and the 
government.  However, police who are educated and well versed in Islam can thwart the 
Taliban and actually bring the people closer to the government.  I had the privilege of 
working with an ANA Battalion Commander who was also a mullah.  This battalion 
commander would recite from the Koran and lead prayers at the local mosque, which 
gained him instant respect and credibility in the community.  
E. FOCUS ON QUALITY NOT QUANTITY  
In his initial assessment, General McChrystal (the ISAF commander) concluded, 
“The ANP must increase in size in order to provide sufficient police needed to hold areas 
that have been cleared of insurgents, and to increase the capacity to secure the 
population.”228  The current authorized strength of the Afghan National Police is 96,800, 
and General McChrystal is recommending further growth of the Afghan National Police 
to a total of 160,000 as soon as practical.229  While increasing the number of Afghan 
National Police may be necessary, three factors must be carefully considered.  First, the 
Afghan government depends on the international community to sustain the current costs 
of its Afghan National Police.  Significantly increasing the numbers of Afghan National 
Police when the Afghan government cannot afford to pay them is potentially disastrous, 
especially if the international community decides to cut funding.  Second, there are 
literally thousands of Afghan National Police who are on the payroll, but do not exist.  
This is because numerous police officials provide false reports to receive payments for 
ghost soldiers (ANP soldiers who only exist on paper).230  While CSTC-A and the 
Ministry of Interior have made significant improvements in this area, there is still major 
reform that needs to take place vis-à-vis police accountability.  Fixing the accountability 
problem will put more police on the ground, save money, and prevent it from recurring in 
the future.  Third, the vast majority of the existing force is incompetent and corrupt and 
needs to be reformed prior to expanding the police force.  If efforts and resources are 
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dedicated to growing the force, fewer will be available to reform the existing police.  
Even worse, putting more police into a corrupt system will only make more corrupt 
police.  The system has to be fixed first, or growth will do more harm than good. 
When it comes to growing the police, quality is more important that quantity.  
This means taking the time to draw the right recruits and then place them in the right 
areas.  If we look back to the demobilization and enlistment of the thousands of well-
trained Afghan Security Guards, or the creation of the Afghan National Auxiliary Police, 
we see that a rapid increase in police numbers without strict oversight can actually 
weaken the state and create a less stable and less secure environment for the Afghan 
people.  The priorities should be to clean up the existing force, hold police officials 
accountable for extortion and corruption, identify the personnel actually on the ground, 
and put the right individuals in the right positions and communities.  Finally, the 
government of Afghanistan and its coalition partners must make every effort to enhance 
the image and status of the Afghan National Police.  Accomplishing this will require 
improving literacy, providing Islamic education, investing in persistent training, and 
paying heed to community consensus. 
F. RECRUIT, VET, AND DEVELOP LOCAL POLICE DURING THE HOLD 
AND BUILD PHASES 
The ANA is best suited for clearing an area, and when present in a local 
community, can deny the Taliban sanctuary.  During this time of denial, the Army can 
provide the temporary security and assistance needed to engage the community in a 
police recruitment drive.  Once an adequate number of local recruits are sanctioned and 
trained, the ANA can gradually withdraw to a less secure area, where it can begin the 
process again.  This would be similar to what the FDD program is trying to achieve, 
except that instead of retraining existing police, large numbers of the recruits would be 
drawn directly from the community.  The ANA should then augment the Afghan National 
Civil Order Police in order to reduce resource requirements and expedite the growth of 
the Afghan National Police.  This bottom-up approach would facilitate long-term 
security, reduce resource requirements, and help ensure the police meet the needs of both 
the people and government. 
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XII. CONCLUSION 
Afghanistan is currently at a tipping point where its government’s 
legitimacy (and that of its international backers) is being openly 
challenged by an array of antigovernment forces.231 
 
The Taliban have come full circle and are regaining their primacy among rural 
Afghans.  Their growing influence and legitimacy directly challenge the government of 
Afghanistan, and, if drastic measures are not taken, the state will fail.  The U.S. and 
international community can only do so much to support the host nation government.  
The people ultimately decide who wins or loses an insurgency, and for the last five years, 
more and more Afghans have decided to choose the Taliban over the government of 
Afghanistan.   
The reason more Afghans are siding with the Taliban is because the Afghan 
government has failed to establish legitimate government services that support the people 
and address their fundamental needs.  The two biggest needs that the Afghan government 
has failed to meet are security and corruption and, because of the government’s failure, 
the Taliban are gaining support in the same way they came to power in 1994.232   The 
Taliban are gaining legitimacy by filling the security and injustice voids created by the 
Afghan government itself.  
The Taliban have been most successful at capitalizing on the failures of the 
Afghan National Police.  While it is the responsibility of the Afghan National Police to 
provide security, justice, dispute resolution, and community service, many Afghan 
National Police abuse their authority and exploit the very people they are charged with 
serving.  The effects of corrupt police are twofold, and are exceptionally damaging in an 
insurgency.  First, corrupt police delegitimize the government.  Second, they create a 
permissive environment for insurgent support.  This is why it is absolutely critical that 
police should be a number one priority for reform and for resources. 
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Making the Afghan National Police a top priority will help stem corruption and 
facilitate security, but resources and training alone will not produce competent or 
legitimate police capable of reversing the Taliban’s influence.  The Afghan National 
Police must meet the traditional and cultural precepts of rural Afghan communities. 
Afghan National Police candidates must be nominated by local community elders 
and then, upon successful completion of training, returned to serve in their local 
community.  Community and tribal ties will help ensure that policemen are accountable 
for their actions.  This will also provide a measure of protection from insurgents, 
particularly now when the people are looking to the Taliban for justice and security in 
areas that are bankrupt of social capital and where locals have no faith and confidence in 
the Afghan police. 
In sum, the most foolproof way to ensure Afghan National Police legitimacy in 
the eyes of rural Afghans is to make the police answerable to the people they serve.  This 
can be accomplished by applying customary law.  Although the specific rules of 
customary law may vary between solidarity groups, customary law is common 
throughout rural Afghanistan.233  Most notably, Afghan National Police who are 
members of the community and have been endorsed by the community elders share a 
common social code of behavior and therefore are accountable to the people they serve; 
who are, after all, their people.  If local police understand the complex social rules, 
reciprocal rights and, most importantly, have the precious social capital needed to bridge 
the gap between the government and their community, then they not only have 
legitimacy, but embody it.  Ultimately, nothing may be more important to the long-term 
stability of the Afghan state then for the police to be of, by, and for the people. 
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APPENDIX A. AFGHANISTAN POLICE TRAINING MISSION 
Basic Police Course Overview 
 
 Current Operational Police Skills, Constitution, Law, First 
Responder Responsibilities, Firearms and Tactical Training 
 
Duration: 8 weeks – 265 hours (12 hours during registration and 253 hours during 8 weeks) 
Prerequisite:   Physical and mental attributes pre-assessed  
Target Audience: Police Recruits 
First Course Run: Proposed Initial Course: March 2009 
Course Goal: 
 
To provide a single, all inclusive basic training for Afghan National Police recruits. 
Course Description: 
  
This is a course designed to give an entry level police recruit the necessary skills to stay 
alive and respond to the police needs of the society. It replaces the idea that different 
units of the ANP need different entry level training. All policemen will share the same 
training and after successful completion of it they will be eligible to take unit specific and 









E i g h t  W e e k  B a s i c  T r a i n i n g  C o u r s e  
Ref. # Course Content Hours 





1. Explain the importance of personal cleanliness. 





Values and Ethics 
Performance Objectives 
1. Understand what ethical behavior is in general, and 
then how it pertains to law enforcement. 
2. Identify the two challenges police face regarding law 
enforcement. 
3. Identify the articles of the UN Code of Conduct for law 
enforcement officials which are directly related to 
police officer ethics. 
4. Identify the three (3) types of criminal conduct that 
result from accepting gifts (gratuities). 
5. State the key reasons why an officer’s personal value 





Afghan Constitution  
Performance Objectives 
1. Understand the role that the Islamic religion plays in 
the Afghanistan Constitution. 
2. Understand that national sovereignty belongs to the 
citizens of Afghanistan. 
3. Know the duties the Afghan state has in creating a 
prosperous and progressive society. 
4. Learn the interior and exterior policies of Afghanistan.  
5. Know the obligation of the state to design effective 





Basic Trauma First Aid 
Performance Objectives 
1. Identify the key elements of officer safety during 
emergency situations.  
2. Identify four (4) responsibilities of the police in relation 
to first aid. 
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3. Demonstrate the Three (3) – Step Process conducted 
at first survey of an emergency scene. 
4. Demonstrate the proper procedure for rescue 
breathing. 
5. Demonstrate the proper procedure for 
cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR).   
6. Demonstrate the proper procedure for the choking 
victims (abdominal thrust). 
7. Outline the secondary survey of victim’s condition. 
8. Outline the procedure to stop bleeding. 
9. Outline the procedure for the treatment of shock. 
10. Demonstrate the procedure for applying pressure 
dressings. 
11. Demonstrate the procedure for treating bone, joint 
and muscle injuries. 
12. List the signs and symptoms for the least three (3) 
medical emergencies and their correct treatments. 





Penal Code  
Performance Objectives  
1. Explain and define the differences between a crime, a 
criminal, and punishment. 
2. Explain the different types of crimes, and explain how 
each crime has a different level of punishment. 
3. Explain the Penal Rights of the individual according to 
the laws of Afghanistan.  
4. Explain the difference between religious laws and 





Criminal Procedure Code  
Performance Objectives  
1. Explain the structure and authorities of the Primary 
Court. 
2. Explain the structure and authorities of the Appeals 
Court.  
3. Explain the structure and authorities of the Supreme 
Court. 
4. Explain the method for bringing punishment claim 
(criminal case) to the court. 
5. Explain the process for investigating crimes. 
6. Explain the investigation of a crime, preparing the 
case for court according to the law, and preparing the 
case to go to court.  
Explain the procedure that the prosecutor would 





Use of Force 
Performance Objectives 
1. State four (4) circumstances in which an officer is 
authorized to use force. 
2. Define the meaning of “Human Rights”. 





Empty Hand Techniques (Soft and Hard) 
Performance Objectives – Officer Survival Skills 
1. Articulate the definition of Hard Empty Hand Control 
and explain the level of the subject’s resistance used 
to control. 
2. State and demonstrate an understanding of the fluid 
shock wave principle. 
3. List and demonstrate the human anatomy as related 
to the primary, secondary, and last resort target areas 
for striking techniques. 
4. List and demonstrate the four (4) basic defensive 
blocks. 
5. Name and demonstrate Escape techniques through 
practical exercise. 
Performance Objectives – Control Techniques 
1. Cite the definition of “soft empty hand control 
techniques” and the level of the subject resistance to 
which these techniques apply. 
2. Be able to demonstrate the Transport Wrist Lock and 
the Straight Arm Take Down. 
3. Demonstrate basic concepts of Balance and 
Positioning. 
4. Demonstrate the two (2) primary defensive hand 
counter strikes. 
5. Demonstrate the three (3) primary leg counter strikes. 
Performance Objectives – Weapon Retention  
1. Students will identify the three (3) concepts of firearm 
retention: stance, alertness, distance. 
2. Students will identify what level of resistance and 
control is associated with firearm retention. 
3. Students will demonstrate the physical components of 






Performance Objectives – Handcuffing 
1. Cite the policy and procedure for handcuffing as 
outlined. 
2. Identify the four (4) primary parts of the handcuff, and 
demonstrate how each of these parts operates.  
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3. Demonstrate proper handcuff placement. 
4. Demonstrate the three (3) methods of proper speed 
cuffing in the standing, kneeling, and prone positions.  
5. Demonstrate the proper procedures associated with 
executing a High Risk Arrest.  
6. Demonstrate the technique of an Iron Wrist Take 
Down.  
Performance Objectives – Searching Persons 
1. Explain the legal basis for searching a person per 
Afghanistan law.  
2. Explain the three (3) major searching considerations. 
3. Demonstrate the proper procedure for search 
techniques. 
4. Explain the considerations of the ANP officer when 
escorting or transporting arrested persons. 
5. Demonstrate searching techniques of combatant vs. 




Human Rights/Prohibition Against Torture 
Performance Objectives – Human Rights 
1. Name three (3) articles of the “Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights”. 
2. Identify at least three (3) elements of Police Authority. 
3. Identify at least two (2) responsibilities of police 
regarding Human Rights. 
4. List five (5) considerations of the police officer 
regarding Use of Force. 
5. Identify four (4) articles of the code of conduct which 
closely relate to the UN declaration of Human Rights.  
Performance Objectives – Right to Life 
1. List at least three (3) documents that protect the right 
to life based on instructional handouts. 
2. Establish a link between police work and international 
human rights standards. 
3. List the three (3) criteria of the Use of force. 
4. Explain how a violation of the right to life is best 
avoided.  
Performance Objectives – Prohibition of Torture 
1. List at least three (3) international human rights 
documents that give protection against being tortured 
(based on instructional handouts). 
2. Define the main elements of torture as stated during 
the lesson. 
3. State the difference between the human rights 
















Handling Prisoner Procedures and Practices 
Performance Objectives 
1. Identify the legal basis for searching a person per the 
Afghanistan law.  
2. Identify the three (3) major searching considerations.  




4. Cite the considerations of the ANP officer when 
escorting or transporting arrested persons. (If time 










First Responder Responsibilities 
Performance Objectives – Patrol Procedures 
1. Identify the philosophies of patrol. 
2. Identify responsibilities of the patrol officer within each 
of the following areas: general responsibilities, 
courteous responsibilities, and personal 
responsibilities. 
3. Identify sources of information within a given patrol 
area for effective patrol work. 
4. List the means by which patrol officers can prevent 
crime while on patrol. 
5. State the reason radios are an essential tool of 
modern policing.  
6. Identify the main features of the two-way radio. 
7. Explain the correct procedure for transmitting a radio 
message. 
8. State the factors which may affect the operational 
range of the radio.  
Performance Objectives – Crime Scene Management 
1. Identify the steps the first officer should take when 
attending a crime scene. 
2. Outline the procedure for ensuring the safety of 
officers and others present at a crime scene. 
3. Identify the importance of medical attention to injured 
persons while preventing contamination of the scene.  
4. Outline the procedure required for protecting the crime 
scene. 
5. Outline the procedure involved in protecting and 
securing crime scene(s). 
6. Explain how to inform a senior investigator what has 
happened. 
7. Identify the types of information that should be 






Traffic Laws/Commercial Vehicles/Traffic Control 
Performance Objectives – Traffic Laws 
1. Provide students with a basic knowledge of Afghan 
traffic laws. 
2. Provide students with knowledge of the techniques for 
manually directing and controlling traffic. 
3. Provide basic knowledge of commercial vehicle 
inspection. 
 
Performance Objectives – Commercial Vehicles  
1. Students demonstrate the use of extreme caution 
when stopping commercial vehicles. 
 
2. Students demonstrate awareness of vehicle 
occupants and properly identify the occupants. 
3. Students demonstrate proper procedure for a walk 
around inspection using the proper inspection criteria. 
4. Students will apply commercial vehicle safety 
information during inspection. 
5. Students will identify the type of cargo and whether it 
is safe in nature.  
 
Performance Objectives – Traffic Control  
1. Identify the objectives of traffic control. 
2. Specify traffic control responsibilities. 
3. List the steps that officers should take in order to direct 
traffic safely and effectively.  
4. Identify the rules for performing point control duty. 
5. Demonstrate the manual control signals and 
procedures for stopping traffic, starting traffic, and 
permitting left and right turns. 
6. List the steps involved when directing traffic at 
     intersections with signals.  
7. Identify the other equipment/props used when directing 





Official Documents, Passports and IDs 
Performance Objectives 
1. Identify and explain what a Passport and Visa are and 
how they are used as official travel documents. 
2. Gain a general understanding of how official travel 
documents are produced. 
3. Understand and identify who commits passport fraud. 
4. Understand what forgery is and in what ways it is 
illegal to use forged documents under Afghan law. 
5. Understand what characteristics the officer should 
look for in a document to identify it as a forgery. 
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6. Gain a basic understanding of how passport fraud is 






1. Identify the component parts of the extendable baton 
and the principles of its maintenance.  
2. Identify the target zones on the body and the strike 
areas of the baton.  
3. State the 40/10 theories and the 90% rule. 






5. Demonstrate the ability to open the baton correctly. 
6. Identify the four (4) components, which must be in 
place when a baton strike is delivered.  
7. Demonstrate the three (3) closed mode strikes.  
8. Demonstrate the five (5) open mode strikes. 
9. Demonstrate baton retention techniques.  








1. Physically identify drugs used or produced in 
Afghanistan. 
2. State most commonly controlled drugs that are 
abused. 
3. State the most important ill effects of the misuse of 
controlled drugs. 
4. State the strategy to deal with the misuse of 
controlled drugs. 
5. List the actions a police should follow when searching 







1. Explain the importance of having a plan to conduct 
fixed and mobile checkpoints. 
2. List five (5) officer precautions when conducting 
checkpoints. 
3. List the six (6) pieces of information to be obtained 
and recorded about drivers, occupants, and vehicles 




4. Identify fifteen (15) items of equipment that an officer 




Police Station Security 
Performance Objectives 
1. Discuss why the police station is important. 
2. Discuss ways of defending a police station against 
attack. 
3. Discuss how to defend a police station. 
4. Discuss the general role of the guard force. 
5. Identify the location of Security Zone 1 and the activity 
that occurs within the zone. 
6. Identify the location of Security Zone 2 and the 
operational activity that occurs within the zone. 
7. Identify the location of Security Zone 3 and the activity 
that occurs within the zone. 
8. Explain what activities that should occur outside of 
Security Zone 1 that can enhance the security of the 
police station. 
9. Discuss the threats that can be directed against the 







1. Define the terms “demonstration”, “mob” and “riot.” 
2. List the twelve (12) procedures for handling a crowd 
or riot. 
3. List the procedure for dealing with civil disturbances. 
4. Demonstrate how to properly wear the helmet, and 
hold the baton and shield. 
5. Demonstrate knowledge of crowd control formations 





Officer Safety and Survival 
Performance Objectives 
1. Define the term, “officer survival”. 
2. Explain the reason why security is important in 
relation to police work. 
3. List the three (3) primary causes for fatal errors that 
Police Officers make and ten (10) fatal errors that kill 
police officers. 
4. Identify and briefly describe the four (4) different 
levels of awareness along the States of Awareness 
Continuum. 




6. List the four (4) ways officers can increase their 
survivability during ambushes. 
7. To enhance officer safety through an understanding 
of the variety of devices/tactics used by terrorist 
groups. 
8. Appreciate the preventative measures that can be 




Terrorist Tactics Overview 
         a.  Terrorist Tactics used in Afghanistan – 2 Hours 
         b.  Terrorist Tactics and the Police Response – 2 Hours 
         c.  Police Response to Suspect Devices – 3 Hours 
         d.  Terrorist Tactics Hostage Survival – 3 Hours 





Explosive Devices/Bomb Scenes 
Performance Objectives 
1. State the definition of IED. 
2. List the four components of IED. 
3. State any six ways where IED can be deployed. 
4. List any five types of chemical that can be used in the 
fabrication of an IED. 
5. List any five places within a car where explosives can 
be concealed. 






Mines and Booby Traps 
Performance Objectives 
1. Recognize and identify key IED components;  
2. Describe methods used by terrorists to activate an 
IED; and  






Surveillance Detection and Intelligence Gathering 
Performance Objectives 
          a.  Police Survival and Surveillance – 3 Hours 





Introduction to Small Unit Tactics 
Basic Foot Patrol - 6 Hours 




Buddy Team Movements – 2 Hours 




Group Field Training Exercises (FDD Practical Exercises) 
 
a.  IED, Bomb Explosions & Cordons - 6 Hours 
b.  Patrol, Fire & Maneuver & React to Ambush – 6 Hours 
c.  Conduct & Arrest utilizing Contact & Cover – 4 Hours 
d.  Checkpoint- Vehicles and Suspicious Persons – 6 Hours 
e.  Vehicle Ops & React to Contact – 2 Hours 
 
24 
BSC28 Drill 24 
BSC29 Physical Fitness 24 
BSC30 
 
Firearms-Rifle Qualification and Pistol Familiarization 
Performance Objectives 
1. Knowledge of the 4 Basic Safety Rules   
2. muzzle discipline  
3. field stripping and cleaning their rifle 
4. trigger pull 







ADVANCED Shooting and Tactics/Movement 
 
A. Advanced Shooting Skills 
• Pivots 
• Shooting on the Move 
 
6 
 Final Exam 2 
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